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Abstract
We examine a model of price competition with strictly convex costs
where the firms simultaneously decide on both price and quantity, are
free to supply less than the quantity demanded, and there is discrete
pricing. If firms are symmetric then, for a large class of residual de-
mand functions, there is a unique equilibrium in pure strategies when-
ever, for a fixed grid size, the number of firms is sufficiently large.
Moreover, this equilibrium price is within a grid-unit of the competi-
tive price. The results go through to a large extent when the firms are
asymmetric, or they are symmetric but play a two stage game and the
tie-breaking rule is ‘weakly manipulable’.
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1 Introduction
Let us consider a Bertrand duopoly where the firms decide on both their
price and output levels and the firms are free to supply less than the quantity
demanded. Edgeworth (1897) argues that in such models equilibria in pure
strategies may not exist (see Dixon (1987), or Friedman (1988) for formal
statements of the problem). In the literature this is often referred to as the
Edgeworth paradox. In this paper we seek to provide a resolution of this
paradox.
We focus on the case where the firms make their price and output deci-
sions simultaneously, though we also examine a variant where the firms first
decide on their prices, and then on their output levels (we restrict atten-
tion to pure strategies). We assume that the price level varies over a grid,
where the size of the grid can be arbitrarily small. There are generally two
problems associated with the existence of pure strategy equilibrium under
price competition. The first reason has to do with the well known open-set
problem. The second one has to do with the fact that the profit function
of a firm may not be quasi-concave in its own price. The grid assumption
allows us to side-step the open set problem, and focus on the second one.
This assumption can also be motivated by appealing to the practice of inte-
ger pricing, or to the fact that there are minimum currency denominations.
Other papers that model such discrete pricing include Dixon (1993) and Roy
Chowdhury (1999).
We examine two main classes of residual demand functions, one where
the tie-breaking rule (henceforth TBR) is ‘weakly manipulable’ (and the
rationing rule is satisfied by a parametric class of rationing rules, though
not the proportional one),1 and another where it is ‘strongly manipulable’.
Suppose that several firms are charging the same price. If the TBR is weakly
manipulable, then, up to a level, the residual demand coming to such a firm is
responsive to an increase in its own output level. Beyond this level, however,
the residual demand may be insensitive to an increase in own output (this
1From now on, for ease of exposition, we shall often use the shorthand - weakly manip-
ulable TBR - to refer to this combination of a weakly manipulable TBR along with the
associated restriction on the rationing rule.
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happens whenever the output levels of the other firms charging this price
are ‘reasonably large’). If, however, the TBR is strongly manipulable, then,
irrespective of the output levels of the other firms charging this price, such
a firm can increase the residual demand coming to it by increasing its own
output level. (Later, in Remarks 2 and 6, we argue that there are very few
papers in the literature that analyze the case where the TBR is effectively
strongly manipulable). Further, both kinds of TBRs allow for spill-overs
in the sense that, in the event of a tie in price, it cannot be that there is
unmet demand at this price, while some of these firms have output that they
cannot sell for lack of demand.
We first consider the case where firms are symmetric (we later analyze
the asymmetric case also). To begin with we examine the setup where the
firms simultaneously decide on both their prices and quantities. For both
kinds of TBRs we demonstrate that if, for any given grid-size, the number of
firms (n) is large enough, then there is a unique Nash equilibrium where the
equilibrium price is within a grid-unit of the competitive price. Moreover,
the output levels of individual firms become vanishingly small as n becomes
very large.
The proofs of the existence results work as follows. Suppose all firms
charge the lowest possible price in the grid that is greater than the marginal
cost at zero. If the TBR is weakly manipulable and n is large, then the
residual demand coming to every firm is small, so that it is residual demand
rather than marginal cost which determines firm supply. In that case price
would not equal marginal cost, and firms may have no incentive to increase
their price levels. Next consider strongly manipulable TBRs. For n large,
competition among firms may lead to excess production so that a firm that
deviates and charges a higher price may have no demand at all.
We then turn to the aggregate output level. If the TBR is weakly manip-
ulable, then, in equilibrium, aggregate output equals demand. If, however,
it is strongly manipulable, then interestingly every firm produces more than
what it sells, so that the equilibrium involves excess production. For this
case, consider the limiting value of the aggregate output as n is taken to
infinity. It turns out to be finite if the marginal cost at the origin is strictly
positive. Otherwise, aggregate output diverges to infinity.
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We then examine the case where, for a fixed n, the grid size is taken
to zero. We find that, for all sufficiently small grid sizes, no single price
equilibrium (i.e. equilibrium where all firms that supply a positive output
charge the same price) exists. Whether, for small grid sizes, there exists
equilibria involving different prices is an open question. In case they do, all
such equilibria are bounded away from the competitive price if the grid size
is sufficiently small.
We next examine the case where the firms are asymmetric. The results
for the symmetric case generalize in a natural fashion when the marginal cost
at zero is the same for all firms. Otherwise, the earlier results go through if it
is the number of ‘efficient’ firms (a firm is said to be efficient if its marginal
cost at zero is less than equal to that of any other firm) that is taken to
infinity. Further, the results for the one-stage game ‘go through’ if the TBR
is weakly manipulable and symmetric firms play a two stage game, where,
in stage 1, they decide on their price, and in stage 2 on their output levels.
Next Section 2 describes the basic framework. Section 3 analyzes a one
stage game with symmetric firms, while the asymmetric case is examined
in Section 4. Section 5 analyzes the two stage game. Section 6 relates the
paper to the literature and concludes. Finally, some proofs which are either
too long, or of mainly technical interest, are in the Appendix.
2 The Framework
There are n identical firms, all producing the same homogeneous good. The
market demand function is q = d(p) and the common cost function of all
the firms is c(q).
A1. d : [0,∞) → [0,∞). The function d(p) is continuous on [0,∞).
Further ∃pmax, 0 < pmax < ∞, such that d(p) > 0 if 0 ≤ p < pmax, and
d(p) = 0 if p ≥ pmax. Moreover, ∀ p′, p′′, such that pmax ≥ p′′ > p′ ≥ 0, it is
the case that d(p′) > d(p′′).
A2. c : [0,∞) → [0,∞). The function c(q) is continuous, increasing
and strictly convex on [0,∞) and twice differentiable on (0,∞). Moreover,
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c(0) = 0 and pmax > limq→0+ c′(q) = c′(0).
We assume that prices vary over a grid. The set of feasible prices F =
{pˆ0, pˆ1, · · ·}, where pˆ0 = 0, and pˆj = pˆj−1 + α, ∀j ∈ {1, 2, · · ·}, where α >
0. Let pi (respectively qi) denote the price charged (respectively quantity
produced) by firm i, where pi ∈ F and qi is a continuous variable ranging
over [0,∞).
Let P = (p1, . . . , pn), Q = (q1, . . . , qn) and P,Q = (p1, . . . , pn, q1, . . . , qn).
For any P,Q, let Qpi (respectively Q
pi) denote the vector generated
from Q by deleting all qj , j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}, such that pj ≥ pi (respectively
pj ≤ pi). Clearly, Qpi (respectively Qpi) denotes the output vector of the
firms charging less (respectively more) than pi. Similarly, let P pi denote the
price vector of the firms charging more than pi.
Let Ri(P,Q), Ri : [0,∞)2n → [0,∞), denote the residual demand facing
firm i as a function of the price quantity vector in the market.
If S(j) denotes some statement involving firm j, then
∑
k|S(k) qk denotes
the sum of qk over all k, k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}, such that S(k) holds.
A3. (i) ∀p ≥ 0, if ∑j|pj=p qj ≥ d(p), then Ri(P,Q)|pi>p = 0.
(ii) ∀p ≥ 0, ∑i|pi=pRi(P,Q) ≤ d(p).
(iii) For any P,Q, and ∀i, j such that i 6= j, let P ij , Qij = (pij1 , . . . , pijn , qij1 , . . . , qijn )
satisfy piji = pj , p
ij
j = pi, q
ij
i = qj , q
ij
j = qi, and ∀k /∈ {i, j}, pijk = pk and
qijk = qk. Then Ri(P,Q) = Rj(P
ij , Qij).
(iv) ∀P,Q, Ri(P,Q) is independent of both Qpi and P pi .
(v) ∀P,Q, Ri(P,Q)|∀j 6=i, pj 6=pi is continuous in qi. Furthermore,
maxqi Ri(P,Q)|∀j 6=i, either pj>pi, or pj<pi and qj=0 = d(pi).
(vi) Consider P,Q = (p1, . . . , pn, q1, . . . , qn) and P ′, Q′ = (p′1, . . . , p′m, q′1, . . . , q′m)
(where m ≥ n) such that pi = p′i for some i ≤ n, no firm other than
i charges pi (respectively p′i) in P,Q (respectively P ′, Q′) and, ∀p < pi,∑
k|pk=p qk =
∑
m|p′m=p q
′
m. Then the residual demand of firm i is the same
irrespective of whether it faces P,Q or P ′, Q′.
For any price p, A3(i) states that if the total output of all firms charging
p is at least d(p), then all firms who charge prices greater than p obtain
no demand. A3(ii) states that the aggregate residual demand of all the
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firms charging some price p can be at most d(p). A3(iii) is a symmetry
assumption. A3(iv) states that the residual demand of firm i, say, is inde-
pendent of the price and output levels of the firms who charge prices higher
than pi. Next, note that given A3(ii), maxqi≥0Ri(P,Q)|∀j 6=i, pj 6=pi equals
maxqi|0≤qi≤d(pi)Ri(P,Q)|∀j 6=i, pj 6=pi , which, given the continuity assumption
in A3(v), is well defined. A3(v) states that if there is a single firm, say i,
charging the effectively lowest price, then its maximal residual demand is
d(pi). Finally, A3(vi) states that in case firm i is the only firm charging pi,
then the residual demand of firm i remains unchanged at any other price
quantity vector (with possibly different number of firms) where (a) firm i
alone charges pi and, (b) ∀p < pi, the aggregate output of firms charging p
is the same as that under the original vector.
For any P , define P (i) = (p1(i), . . . , pn(i)), such that pj(i)|j 6=i, pj=pi =
pmax, pi(i) = pi and pk(i)|pk 6=pi = pk.
Given A3(iii) and A3(v), ∀pi < pmax we can define
Rpi(P,Q) = max
qi
Ri(P (i), Q).
Given any P,Q such that pi < pmax, Rpi(P,Q) denotes the maximal residual
demand for firm i if all other firms charging pi switch to charging pmax, and,
given this new price vector, firm i sets qi appropriately.
Given A3(iii), ∀i, j such that i 6= j, Rpi(P,Q) = maxqi Ri(P (i), Q) =
max
qijj
Rj(P ij(j), Qij) = R
pijj (P ij , Qij). Thus Rpi(P,Q) depends on the
magnitude of pi, but not on the identity of the firm charging pi. Hence
we can define
Rp(P,Q) = Rpi(P,Q)|pi=p.
2.1 Weakly Manipulable TBR
In this sub-section we introduce the notion of weakly manipulable TBRs.
Assumption 4(i) below is a restriction on the TBR, whereas 4(ii) is a restric-
tion on both the rationing rule, as well as the TBR. For any set S, let N(S)
denote the number of elements in S.
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A4.(i) ∀p, such that 0 ≤ p < pmax, define Mp = {i| pi = p} and
Kp = {j| pj = p, qj = 0}. Further, let N(Mp) = mp and N(Kp) = kp (≤
mp). Then Ri(P,Q)|i∈Mp−Kp = qi, if either
∑
j|j∈Mp−Kp qj ≤ Rp(P,Q), or∑
j|j∈Mp−Kp qj > R
p(P,Q) and qi ≤ R
p(P,Q)
mp−kp . Otherwise, Ri(P,Q)|i∈Mp−Kp ≥
Rp(P,Q)
mp−kp .
Next, ∀pi, p satisfying pmax > pi ≥ p > 0, define
ri(pi, p, n) = max
qi
Ri(P,Q)|∀j 6=i, pj=p and qj= d(p)n , and pi≥p.
2
Given A3(ii) and the first sentence in A3(v), ri(pi, p, n) is well defined for
pi > p. Moreover, from A4(i), ri(pi, p, n)|pi=p is well defined and, from A3(ii)
and A4(i), equals d(p)n .
A4.(ii) Consider P,Q such that ∃p′, p′′, pmax ≥ p′′ > p′ > 0, such
that firm i (≤ n) is charging a price pi, where p′′ ≥ pi ≥ p′, there are
m′ (n − 1 ≥ m′ ≥ 1) firms (other than i) charging p′, and no other
firms charge any price p, p′′ > p ≥ p′. Then maxqi Ri(P,Q) is twice
differentiable in pi over (p′, p′′), maxqi Ri(P,Q) is decreasing in pi over
[p′, p′′), and ∂[maxqi Ri(P,Q)]∂pi and
∂2[maxqi Ri(P,Q)]
∂p2i
are both (weakly) decreas-
ing in pi over (p′, p′′). Further, define P k, Qk = (pk1, · · · , pkk, qk1 , · · · , qkk)
such that k is some integer satisfying k ≥ n, Pn, Qn = P,Q (where P,Q
is as defined in A4(ii) earlier), and, ∀l ≥ n, we have that pl+1j = plj
∀j ≤ l, pl+1l+1 = p′, ql+1k |k 6=i,pl+1
k
6=p′ = q
l
k, q
l+1
j |j 6=i,pl+1j =p′ =
Rp
′
(P l+1,Ql+1)
m′+l+2−n , and
ql+1i = maxql+1i
Ri(P l+1, Ql+1). Let Rki (P
k, Qk) denote the residual demand
of firm i when facing P k, Qk. Then limpki→p′+
∂[max
qk
i
Rki (P
k,Qk)]
∂pki
is (weakly)
increasing in k and limk→∞ limpki→p′+
∂[max
qk
i
Rki (P
k,Qk)]
∂pki
< 0. Finally, ∀P,Q
s.t. ri(pi, p, n) is well defined, ri(pi, p, n) is (weakly) concave in pi.
Given A4(ii), note that limpi→p′+
∂[maxqi Ri(P,Q)]
∂pi
, limpi→p′+
∂2[maxqi Ri(P,Q)]
∂p2i
and limk→∞ limpki→p′+
∂[max
qk
i
Rki (P
k,Qk)]
∂pki
are well defined, ri(pi, p, n) is de-
creasing in pi and limn→∞ limpi→p+ r′i(pi, p, n) < 0.
2For ease of exposition we suppress the fact that ri(pi, p, n) is a function of qj , j 6= i.
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We next relate Assumption 4 to the literature. We first consider A4(i).
Note that any firm i, i ∈Mp−Kp, can increase the residual demand coming
to it by increasing its output level qi till
Rp(P,Q)
mp−kp (in fact the residual demand
equals qi). Beyond this output level
Rp(P,Q)
mp−kp , however, the residual demand
of firm i may not respond to an increase in its output level. Suppose all
other firms in Mp supply at least
Rp(P,Q)
mp−kp . Then, from A4(i), all these firms
have a residual demand of at least R
p(P,Q)
mp−kp . Thus, from A3(ii), the residual
demand coming to firm i is at most R
p(P,Q)
mp−kp . This formalizes the notion that
the TBR is weakly manipulable.
Further, note that A4(i) allows for the possibility that if some of the
firms supply less than R
p(P,Q)
mP−kp , then the residual demand facing the other
firms may be greater than R
p(P,Q)
mP−kp . Such spill-over of unmet residual demand
is, in fact, allowed for by Davidson and Deneckere (1986), Deneckere and
Kovenock (1996) and Kreps and Scheinkman (1983). (This TBR is also
discussed in Vives (1999).) Thus the TBR formalized through A4(i) is in
the spirit of the above literature.3
We then claim that the restrictions on ri(pi, p, n) are satisfied by a
parametric class of rationing rules (though not the proportional one). Us-
ing the combined rationing rule introduced by Tasna´di (1999b), suppose
ri(pi, p, n) = max{d(pi) − n−1n d(p)[(1 − λ)d(pi)d(p) + λ], 0}, where λ ∈ [0, 1].
For λ = 1, this satisfies the efficient rationing rule, whereas for λ = 0, this
satisfies the proportional rationing rule. For intermediate values of λ, other
rationing rules emerge (see Tasna´di (1999b) for an interpretation). Clearly,
if d(pi) is concave then ri(pi, p, n) is decreasing and concave in pi. More-
over, it is the case that limn→∞ limpi→p+ r′i(pi, p, n) = λd′(p). So ∀λ > 0,
and ∀p < pmax, limn→∞ limpi→p+ r′i(pi, p, n) < 0.
2.2 Strongly Manipulable TBR
We then define strongly manipulable TBRs.
3Papers which consider TBRs that do not allow for such spill-over, include Dixon
(1984), Maskin (1986), Levitan and Shubik (1972) and Yoshida (2002).
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A5. Consider any P,Q. Let Mp˜ = {j| pj = p˜} and N(Mp˜) = mp˜. Then
Ri(P,Q)|i∈Mp˜ =
 qi, if
∑
j|j∈Mp˜ qj ≤ R
p˜(P,Q),
γ(qi,
∑
j|j∈Mp˜,j 6=i qj)R
p˜(P,Q), if
∑
j|j∈Mp˜ qj > R
p˜(P,Q),
(1)
where γ : [0,∞)×[0,∞)−{(0, 0)} → [0, 1] and∑i∈Mp˜ γ(qi,∑j|j∈Mp˜,j 6=i qj) =
1.
The first line of Eq. (1) captures the idea that the TBR allows for spill-
overs of unmet residual demand. We assume that γ(qi,
∑
j 6=i qj) satisfies the
following assumption.
A6. (i) γ1(qi,
∑
j 6=i qj), γ11(qi,
∑
j 6=i qj) and γ12(qi,
∑
j 6=i qj) are well de-
fined on (0,∞)× (0,∞).
(ii) γ1(qi,
∑
j 6=i qj) > 0, γ11(qi,
∑
j 6=i qj) < 0 and γ11(qi,
∑
j 6=i qj)< γ12(qi,
∑
j 6=i qj).
Moreover, γ12(qi,
∑
j 6=i qj) < 0 whenever
∑
j 6=i qj > qi.
(iii) γ1(x, (n−1)x) is decreasing in both x and n. Moreover, limx→0 γ1(x, (n−
1)x)→∞ and limx→∞ γ1(x, (n− 1)x) = 0.
(iv) If limr→∞ a(r) = 0 and limr→∞ b(r) = L, where 0 ≤ L < ∞, then
limr→∞ γ1(a(r), b(r)) = 1L if L > 0, and limr→∞ γ1(a(r), b(r)) → ∞, if
L = 0.
(v) If limr→∞ a(r) = 0 and limr→∞ b(r)→∞, then limr→∞ γ1(a(r), b(r)) =
0.
(vi) If, for any strictly increasing sequence of natural numbers < nm >,
limm→∞ x(nm) = D > 0, then limm→∞ γ1(x(nm), (nm − 1)x(nm)) = 0.
Consider any price pi such that Rpi(P,Q) > 0. Then, irrespective of the
output levels of the other firms charging pi, any firm charging pi can increase
the residual demand coming to it by increasing its own output level. This
formalizes the idea that the TBR is strongly manipulable.
Papers in the literature that adopt a strongly manipulable TBR include,
for example, Allen and Hellwig (1986, 1993), Osborne and Pitchik (1986),
Maskin (1986) (the first example provided by him) and Tasna´di (1999b).
Appropriately extending the TBRs in these papers to the present context,
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one can write that
γ(qi,
∑
j 6=i
qj) =
qi∑m
j=1 qj
.
Observe that in this case γ1(qi,
∑
j 6=i qj) =
∑
j 6=i qj
(
∑m
j=1
qj)2
and γ1(x, (n− 1)x) =
(n−1)
n2x
so that A6 goes through.
This paper covers the case where the rationing rule is efficient (and the
TBR is either weakly, or strongly manipulable), as well as the case where
the rationing rule is proportional and the TBR is strongly manipulable.
What happens in case a proportional rationing rule is coupled with a weakly
manipulable TBR is an open question.4
3 One-stage Game: The Symmetric Case
In this section we consider a one-stage game where the i-th firm’s strategy
consists of simultaneously choosing both a price pi ∈ F and an output
qi ∈ [0,∞). All firms move simultaneously. We solve for the set of pure
strategy Nash equilibria of this game.
We follow Edgeworth (1897) in assuming that firms are free to supply less
than the quantity demanded, rather than Chamberlin (1933), who assumes
that firms meet the whole of the demand coming to them.
Next let p∗ be the minimum p ∈ F such that p > c′(0). Thus p∗ is the
minimum price on the grid which is strictly greater than c′(0). We assume
that α is not too large in the sense that p∗ < pmax. Since p∗ ∈ F , let p∗ = pˆj
for some integer j.
Let q∗ = c′−1(p∗)5 and let n∗ be the smallest possible integer such that
∀N ≥ n∗,
d(p∗)
N
< c′−1(p∗) = q∗.
Thus for all N greater than n∗, if a firm charges p∗ and sells d(p
∗)
N , then the
price p∗ is strictly greater than marginal costs.
4While Roy Chowdhury (1999) does consider a similar case, the cost function used is
discontinuous at zero and the TBR does not allow for spill-overs.
5Since, ∀q > 0, c′(q) is well defined and strictly increasing, c′−1(p) is well defined
∀p > c′(0). For p ≤ c′(0), we define c′−1(p) = 0.
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3.1 Weakly Manipulable TBR
For this case we argue that for a given grid size, p∗ can be sustained as the
unique Nash equilibrium price of this game whenever n is sufficiently large.
Let nˆ be the smallest possible integer such that ∀N ≥ nˆ,
[p∗ − c′(d(p
∗)
N
)]r′i(pi, p
∗, N)|pi→p∗+ +
d(p∗)
N
< 0.6
Comparing the definitions of n∗ and nˆ, we find that nˆ ≥ n∗.
We next define p˜i to be the profit of a firm that charges p∗ and sells d(p
∗)
n∗ .
Thus p˜i = p
∗d(p∗)
n∗ − c(d(p
∗)
n∗ ). Since
d(p∗)
n∗ < q
∗, it follows that p˜i > −c(0),
where −c(0) denotes the profit of a firm which does not produce at all.
Now consider some pˆi ∈ F , such that pˆi > p∗. Let qˆi satisfy pˆi = c′(qˆi).
Next consider a firm that charges pˆi and sells
d(pˆi)
k . Clearly the profit of
such a firm is pˆi
d(pˆi)
k − c(d(pˆi)k ).
We then define ni to be the smallest possible integer such that ∀k ≥ ni,
d(pˆi)
k < qˆi and
pˆid(pˆi)
k
− c(d(pˆi)
k
) < p˜i.7
Suppose that in any equilibrium the number of firms charging pˆi, say m˜,
is greater than or equal to ni. Then at least one of these firms would have
a residual demand that is less than or equal to d(pˆi)m˜ . Since
d(pˆi)
m˜ < c
′−1(pˆi),
this firm would sell at most d(pˆi)m˜ and have a profit less than p˜i.
Let pˆk be the largest price belonging to F such that pˆk ≤ pmax.
Definition. N1 =
∑k
i=j+1 ni + n
∗ − 1.8
For the case where the TBR is weakly manipulable, Proposition 1 below
provides a resolution of the Edgeworth paradox.
6Notice that limn→∞[{p∗ − c′( d(p
∗)
n
)}r′i(pi, p∗, n)|pi→p∗+ + d(p
∗)
n
] = limn→∞[(p∗ −
c′(0))r′i(pi, p
∗, n)|pi→p∗+]. Since, p∗ > c′(0) and limn→∞[r′i(pi, p∗, n)|pi→p∗+] < 0 (A4(ii)),
this term is negative.
7Clearly the left hand side of this inequality is decreasing in k. Moreover, as k goes to
infinity, this term goes to −c(0) ≤ 0. Thus ni is well defined.
8Note that the assumption that the demand function intersects the price axis is required
for this definition.
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Proposition 1. Suppose Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 4 hold. If n ≥
max{nˆ, N1}, then the unique equilibrium involves all the firms charging a
price of p∗, and producing d(p
∗)
n .
Proof. Existence. From the definition of p∗, undercutting is not prof-
itable. We then argue that for the i-th firm, charging a higher price, pi,
is not profitable either. We first claim that ri(p∗, p∗, n) =
d(p∗)
n . From
A3(v) and A4(i), ri(p∗, p∗, n) ≥ d(p
∗)
n , and ∀j 6= i, Rj(P,Q) ≥ d(p
∗)
n . Thus∑
k≤nRk(P,Q) ≥ d(p∗). The claim now follows from A3(ii).
Since n ≥ nˆ ≥ n∗, d(p∗)n < c′−1(p∗). Hence for any pi ≥ p∗,
c′−1(pi) ≥ c′−1(p∗) > d(p
∗)
n
= ri(pi, p∗, n)|pi→p∗+ ≥ ri(pi, p∗, n), (2)
where the last inequality follows from A4(ii). Since c′−1(pi) > ri(pi, p∗, n),
for any pi ≥ p∗, the deviant firm supplies the whole of the residual demand
coming to it. Hence the profit of a firm which charges a price pi (≥ p∗)
pi(pi, ri(pi, p∗, n)) = piri(pi, p∗, n)− c(ri(pi, p∗, n)). (3)
Clearly
∂pi(pi, ri(pi, p∗, n))
∂pi
= r′i(pi, p
∗, n)[pi − c′(ri(pi, p∗, n))] + ri(pi, p∗, n). (4)
Next from equation (1) it follows that ∀pi ≥ p∗, pi > c′(ri(pi, p∗, n)). Hence
from the concavity of ri(pi, p∗, n) it follows that pi(pi, ri(pi, p∗, n)) is concave
in pi.9 Moreover,
∂pi(pi, ri(pi, p∗, n))
∂pi
|pi→p∗+ = [p∗−c′(
d(p∗)
n
)]r′i(pi, p
∗, n)|pi→p∗++
d(p∗)
n
. (5)
Since n ≥ nˆ, we have that ∂pi(pi,ri(pi,p∗,n))∂pi |pi→p∗+ < 0. Next, from the
concavity of pi(pi, ri(pi, p∗, n)) it follows that ∀pi ≥ p∗, the profit of any
deviant firm is decreasing in pi.
9This follows since
∂2pi(pi, ri(pi, p
∗, n))
∂p2i
= r′′i (pi, p
∗, n)[pi − c′(ri(pi, p∗, n))] + 2r′i(pi, p∗, n)
− c′′(ri(pi, p∗, n))r
′2
i (pi, p
∗, n).
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Next, from A3(v) and A4(i), all firms, by producing d(p
∗)
n , can have a
residual demand of at least d(p
∗)
n . Thus, given that
d(p∗)
n < c
′−1(q∗), all firms
produce at least d(p
∗)
n . Hence, from A3(ii), the residual demand facing all
firms is exactly d(p
∗)
n .
Uniqueness. Step 1. We first claim that there cannot be an equilibrium
where the output level of some of the firms is zero. This follows since these
firms can always charge p∗ and obtain a residual demand of at least d(p
∗)
n
(A3(v) and A4(i)). Since p∗ > c′(0), producing a small enough positive
output would increase their profit from −c(0).
Step 2. We then argue that there cannot be some pˆi (∈ F ) > p∗, such
that some of the firms charge pˆi and supply a positive amount. Suppose to
the contrary that such a price exists. This implies that the total number
of firms charging p∗, say n˜, can be at most n∗ − 1. Otherwise, given A3(v)
and A4(i) and the fact that d(p
∗)
n˜ < c
′−1(p∗), all firms must be supplying at
least d(p
∗)
n˜ . From A3(ii), all firms have a residual demand of
d(p∗)
n˜ . Hence all
firms would supply d(p
∗)
n˜ and the residual demand at any higher price, pˆi,
would be zero.
Now consider some pˆi > p∗. Clearly, the number of firms charging pˆi is
less than ni. Otherwise, some of these firms would have a profit less than
p˜i. Hence such a firm would have an incentive to deviate to p∗, when it can
supply at least d(p
∗)
n∗ and earn p˜i. Thus the total number of firms producing
a strictly positive amount is less than N1, thereby contradicting step 1.
Step 3. Finally, note that by charging p∗ and, by supplying d(p
∗)
n , all
firms can earn a strictly positive profit. Hence, from step 2, all firms charge
p∗. Moreover, for a firm charging p∗, its profit level is strictly increasing
in the output level till d(p
∗)
n . Thus, given A3(ii), A3(v) and A4(i), all firms
supply exactly d(p
∗)
n .
Note that the equilibrium price is within α of the competitive price. The
idea behind the existence result is simple. Consider a market price of p∗. If
n is large then the residual demand coming to every firm is very small, so
that it is residual demand rather than marginal cost which determines firm
supply. In that case price would not equal marginal cost, and, given A3 and
A4, firms may no longer have an incentive to increase their price levels.
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3.2 Strongly Manipulable TBR
To begin with define q′(n− 1) as satisfying the following equation:
p∗d(p∗)γ1(q, (n− 1)q) = c′(q). (6)
Thus if the market price is p∗ and all the firms produce q′(n − 1), then,
for all firms, marginal revenue equals marginal cost. It is easy to see that
q′(n− 1) is decreasing in n.10
We are going to argue that for n large, the outcome where all the firms
charge p∗ and produce q′(n − 1), can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium.
We then introduce a series of lemmas that we require for our analysis.11
Lemma 1. limn→∞ p∗d(p∗)γ1(
d(p∗)
n−1 , d(p
∗)) > limn→∞ c′(
d(p∗)
n−1 ).
Given Lemma 1, defineM1 to be the smallest integer such that ∀n ≥M1,
p∗d(p∗)γ1(
d(p∗)
n− 1 , d(p
∗)) > c′(
d(p∗)
n− 1).
Lemma 2. ∀n ≥M1, (n− 1)q′(n− 1) > d(p∗).
Consider an outcome such that all the firms charge p∗ and produce q′(n−
1). Then Lemma 2 suggests that if n ≥M1, then the residual demand facing
any firm that deviates and charges a price greater than p∗ would be zero.
This follows since the total production by the other firms will be enough to
meet d(p∗). Moreover, Lemma 2 also implies that ∀n ≥M1, q′(n− 1) > 0.
Next define
pˆi = max
q
{
p∗d(p∗)γ(q, (n∗ − 1)q∗)− c(q), if q > d(p∗)− (n∗ − 1)q∗,
p∗q − c(q), otherwise.
(7)
Suppose that n∗ of the firms charge p∗, and all other firms charge a higher
price. Moreover, out of the n∗ firms, suppose (n∗ − 1) of the firms produce
10Notice that given A6(iii), q′(n− 1) is well defined. That q′(n− 1) is decreasing in n,
follows from Eq. (6) and the fact that γ1(x, nx) is decreasing in x and n.
11The proofs of lemmas 1-4, as well as Proposition 4 later, are in the appendix. The
proofs of other lemmas and propositions are available from the author.
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q∗ and the remaining firm produces q. Then pˆi denotes the maximum profit
that this firm can earn if it chooses its output level optimally.
Next consider some pˆi (∈ F ) > p∗. Recall that qˆi satisfies pˆi = c′(qˆi).
Let nˆi be the minimum integer such that ∀k ≥ nˆi, d(pˆi)k < qˆi and
pˆid(pˆi)
k
− c(d(pˆi)
k
) < pˆi.
Lemma 3. If the number of firms charging pˆi is greater than or equal
to nˆi, then the profit of some of these firms would be less than pˆi.
Lemma 3 provides an interpretation of nˆi. We need a further definition.
Definition. M2 =
∑k
i=j+1 nˆi + n
∗ − 1.
We then state and prove the next proposition.
Proposition 2. Suppose Assumptions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 hold and, more-
over, let n ≥ max{M1,M2}. Then the unique equilibrium involves all the
firms charging p∗, producing q′(n− 1) and selling d(p∗)n .
Proof. Existence. Step 1. Since, from Lemma 2, (n−1)q′(n−1) > d(p∗),
it is not possible for any firm to increase its price and gain, as the deviating
firm will have no residual demand. Of course, from the definition of p∗ it
follows that undercutting is not profitable either.
Step 2. We then argue that none of the firms can change its output
level and gain. Suppose firm i produces qi, while the other firms produce
q′(n− 1). Then the profit of the i-th firm
pii(qi, q′, p∗) = p∗d(p∗)γ(qi, (n− 1)q′)− c(qi). (8)
Observe that the profit function is concave in qi 12 and
∂pii(qi,q
′,p∗)
∂qi
|qi=0 > 0.13
12This follows since ∂
2pii(qi,q
′,p∗)
∂q2
i
= p∗d(p∗)γ11(qi, (n− 1)q′)− c′′(qi) < 0.
13Suppose not, i.e. let p∗d(p∗)γ1(0, (n− 1)q′)− c′(0) ≤ 0. Then,
c′(q′(n− 1)) = p∗d(p∗)γ1(q′(n− 1), (n− 1)q′(n− 1))
< p∗d(p∗)γ1(0, (n− 1)q′(n− 1)) (as γ11 < 0) ≤ c′(0),
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We then notice that
∂pii(qi, q′, p∗)
∂qi
|qi=q′ = p∗d(p∗)γ1(q′, (n− 1)q′)− c′(q′) = 0, (9)
where the last equality follows from Eq. (6). Thus none of the firms has an
incentive to change their output levels. Finally, given that γ(qi,
∑
j 6=i qj) is
symmetric, all the firms must be selling an identical amount, i.e. d(p
∗)
n .
Uniqueness. Step 1. We first argue that all the firms must be producing
strictly positive amounts in equilibrium. Suppose to the contrary that firm
i has an output level of zero.
(i) First consider the case where the total production by the firms charg-
ing p∗ is less than d(p∗). (Clearly, all firms charging prices less than p∗ would
have an output level of zero). Let the i-th firm charge p∗. Since p∗ > c′(0),
the profit of firm i would increase if it produces a sufficiently small amount.
(ii) Next consider the case where the total production by the firms charg-
ing p∗ is greater than d(p∗). Without loss of generality let these firms be
1, · · · ,m, where m < i, and let q1 > 0. Note that
∂pii
∂qi
|qi=0 = p∗d(p∗)γ1(0,
m∑
j=1
qj)− c′(0)
> p∗d(p∗)γ1(q1,
m∑
j=2
qj)− c′(q1) (since γ11 − γ12 < 0) = ∂pi1
∂q1
= 0.
But then firm i can increase its output slightly from zero and gain.
Step 2. We then argue that there cannot be some p̂i (∈ F ) > p∗ such
that some firms charge p̂i and supply a positive amount.
Suppose to the contrary that such a price exists. This implies that the
total number of firms charging p∗, say n˜, can be at most n∗ − 1. Suppose
not, i.e. let the number of firms be n∗ or more. Moreover, let the aggregate
production by these firms be less than d(p∗). Clearly, all n˜ firms must
be producing q∗. (Since there is excess demand at this price, the residual
demand constraint cannot bind, and the output level of all firms must be
such that price equals marginal cost.) But, from the definition of n∗, this
implies that total production is greater than d(p∗), which is a contradiction.
which is a contradiction.
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Now consider some p̂i > p∗. Clearly, the number of firms charging p̂i is
less than nˆi. Since otherwise some of these firms would have a profit less
than pˆi. But they can always ensure a profit of pˆi by charging p∗. Thus the
total number of firms producing a strictly positive amount is less than N2,
thus contradicting step 1. Hence all the firms must be charging p∗.
Step 3. Let q˜ = (q˜1, · · · , q˜n), denote the equilibrium output vector. First
note that it cannot be the case that
∑
i q˜i < d(p
∗). Since n ≥M2 > n∗ − 1,
for some j, q˜j < c′−1(p∗), and this firm will have an incentive to increase its
output.
We then establish that the equilibrium output vector must be symmetric.
Suppose not, and without loss of generality let q˜2 > q˜1 > 0. Then,
∂pi1
∂q1
|q˜ = p∗d(p∗)γ1(q˜1,
∑
i6=1
q˜i)− c′(q˜1)
> p∗d(p∗)γ1(q˜2,
∑
i6=2
q˜i)− c′(q˜2) (as γ11 − γ12 < 0) = ∂pi2
∂q2
|q˜.(10)
This, however, is a contradiction, since in equilibrium ∂pi1∂q1 |q˜ = 0 = ∂pi2∂q2 |q˜.
Step 4. Finally, we argue that there cannot be another symmetric equilib-
rium where the (common) output level of the firms is different from q′(n−1).
Clearly, in any symmetric equilibrium, the production level of all the firms
must satisfy Eq. (6) which has a unique solution.
The idea behind the existence result is as follows. If the number of firms
is large enough, then competition will drive all the firms to excess production
in an attempt to manipulate the residual demand. This excess production
ensures that if any of the firms charges a price greater than p∗, then the
residual demand facing this firm will be zero. Thus none of the firms have
an incentive to charge a price which is greater than p∗.
We then turn to the limit properties of the equilibrium output levels as
n becomes large.
Lemma 4. limn→∞ q′(n− 1) = 0.
Lemma 4 demonstrates that the output level of each firm becomes van-
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ishingly small as the number of firms becomes very large. Recall, however,
that the equilibrium involves excess production. The next proposition ex-
amines whether in the limit aggregate production, nq′(n − 1), approaches
the demand level, d(p∗), or not.
Proposition 3. Suppose Assumptions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 hold.
(i) If c′(0) = 0, then limn→∞ nq′(n− 1)→∞.
(ii) If c′(0) > 0, then limn→∞ nq′ = d(p∗) p
∗
c′(0) .
Therefore the limiting behavior of the aggregate production level, nq′(n−
1), depends on the value of c′(0). If c′(0) = 0, then aggregate production
increases without bounds. Whereas it converges to d(p∗) p
∗
c′(0) if c
′(0) > 0.
As α goes to zero this term goes to d(c′(0)).
The folk theorem of perfect competition suggests that the perfectly
competitive outcome can be interpreted as the limit of some oligopolistic
equilibrium as the number of firms becomes large. While this issue has
been thoroughly investigated in the context of Cournot competition (e.g.
Novshek (1980), Novshek and Sonnenschein (1983) and Ruffin (1971)), in
the Bertrand framework it remains relatively unexplored.14
The analysis so far allow us to discuss if, in the present framework, the
folk theorem holds or not. From Propositions 1 and 2 we know that, for
a given grid size α, there is a unique equilibrium price that is within α of
the competitive one whenever n is sufficiently large. Also, from Proposition
1 and Lemma 4, the output levels of the individual firms are close to zero
whenever n is large. Furthermore, the aggregate output is well behaved if
the TBR is weakly manipulable, and reasonably so if the TBR is strongly
manipulable and c′(0) > 0.
Hence, for the case where the TBR is weakly manipulable, or it is
strongly manipulable and the marginal cost at the origin is positive, our
results, perhaps, provide a non-cooperative foundation for the theory of
perfect competition, and hence for the folk theorem.
14There are notable exceptions though, e.g. Allen and Hellwig (1986) and Vives (1986).
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3.3 Limit Results for a Fixed n and α Small
Note that, in Propositions 1-3, the analysis is carried out for a given grid
size α, while n is taken to be large. In this sub-section, for a given n, we
focus on examining if, for all sufficiently small α, a single price equilibrium
(defined below) exists. The objective is to examine the sensitivity of the
analysis to the nature of the limiting process.
Definition. A Nash equilibrium PN , QN = (pN1 , · · · , pNn , qN1 , · · · , pNn ) is
said to be a single price equilibrium (henceforth SPE) if, ∀i 6= j, qNi > 0
and qNj > 0 imply that p
N
i = p
N
j .
We require a few more assumptions and notations. A7(i) below imposes
a lower bound on Ri(P,Q), whereas A7(ii) states that Ri(P,Q) is decreasing
in the output of the other firms charging pi or less.
A7. (i) ∀P,Q, Ri(P,Q) ≥ max{0, d(pi)−∑j|j 6=i, pj≤pi qj}.
(ii) ∀P,Q and j, such that j 6= i and pj ≤ pi, Ri(P,Q) is weakly decreas-
ing in qj .
Assumption 8 is a continuity assumption.
A8. Consider P,Q such that all firms other than i charge p′ and sup-
ply d(p
′)
n , and firm i charges pi ≥ p′ and supplies maxqi Ri(P,Q). Then
limpi→p′+
∂[maxqi Ri(P,Q)]
∂pi
is continuous in p′.
Next we define pc(n) as solving p = c′(
d(p)
n ).
Given A1 and A2, it is easy to see that pc(n) is well defined, pmax >
pc(n) > c′(0), pc(n) is decreasing in n and limn→∞ pc(n) = c′(0).
Next, ∀n ≥ 2, and ∀p ≥ 0, let pin(p) = pd(p)n − c(d(p)n ).
A9. (i) ∀n ≥ 2, and ∀p s.t. pmax ≥ p ≥ 0, pin(p) is concave in p.
(ii) ∀p s.t. c′(0) ≤ p ≤ pc(n), limq→ d(p)
n
+
pd(p)γ1(q, (n−1)d(p)n ) < c′(d(p)n ).
A9(i) is a concavity assumption. A9(ii) is satisfied by the example of a
strongly manipulable TBR that follows A6.
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For any vector A = (a1, · · · , am), let A = {a1, · · · , am}. Proposition 4
below is the central result of this sub-section.
Proposition 4. (i) limα→0 p∗(α) = c′(0).
(ii) Suppose Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 4 hold.
(a) limα→0N1(α)→∞.
(b) Let Assumptions 7, 8 and 9(i) hold and let n be fixed. (A) ∃α′ > 0,
such that ∀α, 0 < α < α′, no SPE exists. (B) Further, ∃p˜(n) > c′(0)
and α˜(p˜(n)) > 0, such that ∀α, 0 < α < α˜(p˜(n)), in any equilibrium
P,Q, min{P} > p˜(n).
(iii) Suppose Assumptions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 hold.
(a) limα→0M2(α)→∞.
(b) Let Assumptions 7, 8 and 9 hold and let n be fixed. (A) ∃α′′ > 0
such that ∀α, 0 < α < α′′, no SPE exists. (B) Further, ∃p̂(n) > c′(0)
and α̂(p̂(n)) > 0, such that ∀α, 0 < α < α̂(p̂(n)), in any equilibrium
P,Q, min{P} > p̂(n).
Let us fix n. Proposition 4 shows that, for all sufficiently small α, no
single price equilibrium exists,15 and all equilibria (in case they exist) are
bounded away from the competitive price. Thus Proposition 4 demonstrates
that for the earlier results to go through, n needs to be increasing at a
‘relatively’ faster rate compared to the rate of decrease in α.
4 One-stage Game: The Asymmetric Case
Deneckere and Kovenock (1996) is one of the very few papers that exam-
ine Bertrand-Edgeworth competition in an asymmetric framework. In a
price-setting duopoly where the firms differ in both their unit costs and ca-
pacities, they characterize the set of equilibria and then, as an application,
re-examine the Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) model with asymmetric costs,
demonstrating that the Cournot equilibrium capacity levels need not emerge
15Whether there can be equilibria that are not single price is an open question. Other
papers to focus on SPE include Dixon (1993).
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in equilibrium. In keeping with our approach, however, in this section we
shall be interested in the case where the number of firms is large.
Let there be m types of firms with the cost function of the l-th type
being cl(q). The number of type l firms is denoted by nl, where
∑
l n
l = n.
4.1 Weakly Manipulable TBR
Let p∗l denote the minimum p ∈ F such that p > c′l(0). Let Ril(P,Q) denote
the residual demand function facing the i-th firm of type l. Moreover, let
ril(pi, p, n) = Ril(P,Q), if pi ≥ p, and, ∀j 6= i, pj = p and qj = d(p)n . The
residual demand satisfies appropriately modified versions of A3 and A4.16
Next define n∗l and nˆl in a manner analogous to that of n
∗ and nˆ respectively,
only taking care to use the cost function of the l-th type, cl(q), instead of
c(q) in the definitions. (We can argue, as before, that, ∀l, nˆl ≥ n∗l .)
Definition. Nˆ = max{nˆ1, · · · , nˆm}.
We require some further notations. Let
p˜il =
p∗l d(p
∗
l )
maxq n∗q
− cl( d(p
∗
l )
maxq n∗q
).
Next consider some p̂x ∈ F , such that p̂x > p∗l . Let q̂lx satisfy p̂x =
c′l(q̂lx). Clearly if a type l firm charges p̂x and sells
d(p̂x)
r , then the profit of
such a firm is p̂x
d(p̂x)
r − cl(d(p̂x)r ).
We then define nlx to be the smallest possible integer such that ∀r ≥ nlx,
d(p̂x)
r < q̂lx and
p̂x
d(p̂x)
r
− cl(d(p̂x)
r
) < p˜il.
Suppose that in any equilibrium the number of firms charging p̂x, say
m˜, is greater than or equal to maxq nqx. Then at least one of these firms,
say of type l, would have a residual demand that is less than or equal to
d(p̂x)
m˜ . Since
d(p̂x)
m˜ < c
′−1
l (p̂x), this firm would supply at most
d(p̂x)
m˜ and have
a profit less than p˜il.
16A4(ii) should be modified so that, the restrictions are on Ril(P,Q), rather than on
Ri(P,Q). The changes needed in A4(i) and A3 are equally obvious.
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We restrict attention to two cases, though we also briefly discuss the
other cases.
Case (i). c′1(0) = c′2(0) = · · · = c′m(0).
Note that if, at a given price, any firm finds it profitable to produce a
strictly positive amount, then so will all other firms. For this case let us
redefine p∗ = p∗1 = · · · = p∗m.
Definition. N˜1 =
∑
x=j+1,···,kmaxl nlx +maxl n∗l − 1.
We can now state our next proposition.
Proposition 5. Suppose Assumptions 1, 2, and appropriately modified
versions of 3 and 4 hold, and let c′1(0) = c′2(0) = · · · = c′m(0). If n ≥
max{Nˆ , N˜1}, then the unique equilibrium involves all the firms charging a
price of p∗, and producing d(p
∗)
n .
Case (ii). c′1(0) < c′2(0) < · · · < c′m(0).
Consider any p such that c′1(0) < p < c′2(0). While at this price pro-
ducing a small enough positive level of output is profitable for type 1 firms,
firms of other types will not find it profitable to supply a positive level of
output. Hence type 1 firms are, in some sense, the most efficient.
Definition. Let p∗1 = p̂h (say). Nˆ2 =
∑
x=h+1,···,k n1x + n∗1 − 1.
Proposition 6 below solves for the case when n1 is large.
Proposition 6. Suppose Assumptions 1, 2, and appropriately modified
versions of 3 and 4 hold, and let c′1(0) < c′2(0) < · · · < c′m(0). If α <
c′2(0) − c′1(0) and n1 ≥ max{N11 , Nˆ2}, then there is an equilibrium that
involves all firms of type 1 charging p∗1 and producing
d(p∗1)
n1
, and firms of all
other types charging pmax and having an output level of zero. Furthermore,
any equilibrium involves all firms of type 1 charging p∗1 and producing
d(p∗1)
n1
,
and all other firms having an output level of zero.
In any equilibrium, note that all firms producing a positive amount (i.e.
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type 1 firms) have the same strategies. Further, interpreting c′1(0) as the
perfectly competitive price, p∗1 is within α of the competitive price.
Next suppose that c′1(0) = c′2(0) = · · · = c′j(0) < c′j+1(0) ≤ · · · ≤ c′m(0).
From Propositions 5 and 6, for a given α, if the number of firms of type 1 to
j is large enough, then there is an equilibrium where all such firms charge
p∗1, and all other firms charge pmax and have an output of zero. Furthermore,
any equilibrium involves all firms of type 1 charging p∗1, and all other firms
having an output level of zero.
Finally, consider the case when n1, · · · , nj are exogenously given. In this
case one can construct examples where no equilibrium may exist even if the
number of firms of type j + 1 to m is very large.17
4.2 Strongly Manipulable TBR
Let A1, A2, an appropriately modified version of A3, A5, and A6 hold for
this case.18
We then define q∗l , qˆil, q
′
l(n
l − 1), nˆli, M l1 and M l2 in a manner similar to
that of q∗, qˆl, q′(n− 1), nˆi, M1 and M2 respectively, only taking care to use
the cost function of the l-th type, cl(q), instead of c(q).
We restrict attention to two cases, though we briefly consider the other
cases.
Case (i). c′1(0) = c′2(0) = · · · = c′m(0) = c′(0) (say).
Let (q′11, · · · , q′n11, · · · , q′1m, · · · , q′nmm) solve
p∗d(p∗)γ1(qil,
∑
j
∑
k
qjk − qil)− c′l(qil) = 0, ∀i, l, (11)
where q′il denote the output level of the i-th firm of type l.
If, ∀i, l, ∑a∑b qab − qil > qil > 0, then we can use the Gale-Nikaido
(1965) univalence theorem to show that Eq. (11) has a unique solution (the
17The proof is available from the author.
18Thus γ(qi,
∑
j 6=i qj) is assumed to be independent of firm type. This is for nota-
tional reasons alone. Let γl(qi,
∑
j 6=i qj), the gamma function for type l firms, satisfy
appropriately modified versions of A5 and A6. Under the additional assumption that
lima→0 γl1(a,X) = lima→0 γ
k
1 (a,X), X > 0, it is simple to check that all our results in this
sub-section go through.
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proof is available from the author). Moreover, the solution is symmetric, i.e.
∀l, q′1l = · · · = q′nll = q′l. Thus (q′1, · · · , q′m) solves:
p∗d(p∗)γ1(ql, (nl − 1)ql +
∑
j 6=l
njqj)− c′l(ql) = 0, ∀l. (12)
The proofs of these lemmas 1′ − 4′ below are very similar to that of the
corresponding lemmas 1-4 earlier, and hence omitted.
Lemma 1′. limn→∞ p∗d(p∗)γ1(
d(p∗)
n−1 , d(p
∗)) > limn→∞ c′l(
d(p∗)
n−1 ),∀l.
Given Lemma 1′, we can define M̂1 to be the smallest possible integer
such that ∀l and ∀n ≥ M̂1,
p∗d(p∗)γ1(
d(p∗)
n− 1 , d(p
∗)) > c′l(
d(p∗)
n− 1).
Lemma 2′. If
∑
l n
l ≥ M̂1, then, ∀l, (nl − 1)q′l +
∑
j 6=l njq′j > d(p∗).
We need some more notations.
n∗∗ = max n∗l .
q˜ = maxn′1,···,n′m
∑
l n
′
lq
∗
l such that
∑
l n
′
lq
∗
l < d(p
∗).
pil = max
q
{
p∗d(p∗)γ(q, q˜)− cl(q), if q > d(p∗)− q˜,
p∗q − cl(q), otherwise.
(13)
Note that pil represents the least possible profit that an l type firm can obtain
by charging p∗ when the aggregate output level of the other firms charging
p∗ is q˜, or less. Since q˜ < d(p∗), pil > −cl(0). Moreover, let pi = minl pil.
Next consider some pˆi ∈ F , such that pˆi > p∗. Let nˆil be the minimum
integer such that ∀k ≥ nˆil, d(pˆi)k < qˆil and
pˆid(pˆi)
k
− cl(d(pˆi)
k
) < pˆi.
Lemma 3′ below provides an interpretation of nˆil.
Lemma 3′. If the number of type l firms charging pˆi (∈ F ) > p∗ is
greater than or equal to nˆil, then the profit of some of these firms would be
less than pi.
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Definition. M̂2 = n∗∗ − 1 +∑ki=j+1maxl nˆil.
Proposition 7. Suppose Assumptions 1, 2, an appropriately modified
version of 3, 5 and 6 hold and c′1(0) = c′2(0) = · · · = c′m(0) = c′(0). If,∑
l n
l ≥ max{M̂1, M̂2}, then there is a unique Nash equilibrium where all
firms of type l charge p∗ and produce q′l. Moreover, all firms of the same
type sell the same amount.
We then turn to the limit properties of the equilibrium outputs. We
first impose some structure on the limiting process. Let us fix some vector
(n1, · · · , nm). We then define an r-economy to be one where the number of
type l firms is rnl. Let (q′1(r), · · · , q′m(r)) solve an appropriately modified
version of Eq. (12) for the r-economy.
Lemma 4′. limr→∞ q′l(r) = 0, ∀l.
We then examine whether in the limit the aggregate production,
∑
j rn
jq′j(r),
approaches the demand level d(p∗) or not.
Proposition 8. Suppose Assumptions 1, 2, an appropriately modified
version of 3, 5 and 6 hold and c′1(0) = c′2(0) = · · · = c′m(0) = c′(0).
(i) If c′(0) = 0, then limr→∞
∑
j rn
jq′j(r)→∞.
(ii) If c′(0) > 0, then limr→∞
∑
j rn
jq′j(r) = d(p∗)
p∗
c′(0) .
Therefore, as in the case with symmetric firms, if c′(0) = 0, then ag-
gregate production increases without bounds, whereas if c′(0) > 0, then
aggregate production converges to d(p∗) p
∗
c′(0) .
It is natural to ask if Lemma 4′ and Proposition 8 go through in case,
say, nl is taken to infinity, while ∀j 6= l, nj is kept constant. We can mimic
the proof of Lemma 4′ to show that limnl→∞ q′l = 0. Moreover, we can
mimic the proof of Proposition 8 to demonstrate that if c′(0) = 0, then
limnl→∞
∑
j n
jq′j(nl) → ∞, and, if c′(0) > 0, then limnl→∞
∑
j n
jq′j(nl) =
d(p∗) p
∗
c′(0) .
19 However, what happens to q′j(nl)|j 6=l, as nl is taken to infinity,
19This is true since, for a corresponding version of Proposition 8 to go through, it is
sufficient that limnl→∞ q
′
l = 0.
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is an open question.
Case (ii). c′1(0) < c′2(0) < · · · < c′m(0).
Proposition 9 below examines the case when n1 is large.
Proposition 9. Let Assumptions 1, 2, an appropriately modified version
of 3, 5 and 6 hold and c′1(0) < c′2(0) < · · · < c′m(0). Moreover, suppose that
α < c′2(0)−c′1(0) and n1 ≥ max{M11 ,M12 }. Then there is an equilibrium that
involves all firms of type 1 charging p∗1, producing q′1(n1−1) and selling d(p
∗
1)
n1
,
and all other firms charging pmax and having an output of zero. Furthermore,
any equilibrium involves all firms of type 1 charging p∗1, producing q′1(n1−1)
and selling d(p
∗
1)
n1
, and all other firms having an output of zero.
Next suppose c′1(0) = c′2(0) = · · · = c′j(0) < c′j+1(0) ≤ · · · ≤ c′m(0).
Combining Propositions 7 and 9, it is easy to see that if
∑j
1 n
l is large
enough, then there is an equilibrium where all firms of type 1 to j charge
p∗1, and all other firms have an output of zero. What happens in case there
are a large number of firms of type j + 1 to m, and firms of type 1 to j are
relatively few in number, is an open question.
5 Two-stage Model
We then examine the case where the firms are symmetric and play a two
stage game where, in stage 1, the firms simultaneously announce their prices,
and in stage 2, they simultaneously decide on their output levels. Moreover,
in stage 2, the price vector announced in stage 1 is common knowledge.
Fudenberg and Tirole (1987) and Tirole (1988) both employ such two-
stage models to provide a game-theoretic foundation of contestability. In
a two stage framework with continuous prices, convex costs, and costs of
turning customers away, Dixon (1990) finds that if the industry is large
enough, then the competitive price will be an equilibrium. Moreover, if costs
of turning consumers away are small, then all equilibria will be close to the
competitive one. Maskin (1986) shows that under a two-stage framework
an equilibrium exists (for general TBRs). Whereas in a symmetric two-
stage framework with strictly convex costs, efficient rationing, and the equal-
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shares TBR, Yoshida (2002) characterizes the symmetric mixed strategy
equilibrium.
5.1 Weakly Manipulable TBR
We then solve for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (spNe) of this game.
We need some further notations. Consider some P,Q. Given A3(iv),
∀pi < pmax we can define Rpi(P,Qpi) = Rpi(P,Q).
Next let (p1, . . . , pn, q1(P ), . . . , qn(P )) denote a spNe, where pi denotes
firms i’s stage 1 strategy and qi(P ) denotes its stage 2 strategy (as a function
of the stage 1 price vector P ).
Finally, if ∀i, firm i produces qi(P ), then let Qpi(P ) denote the output
vector of all firms charging less than pi.
Proposition 10. Suppose Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4 hold. If n ≥
max{nˆ, n∗ + 1, N1}, then, the unique spNe of the two stage game involves
pj = p∗ and qj(P ) = min{
Rpj (P, Qpj (P ))
mj(P )
, c′−1(pj)}, ∀j, wheremj(P ) denotes
the number of firms charging pj.
Note that along the equilibrium path, in stage 1 all firms charge p∗, and
in stage 2, all firms produce d(p
∗)
n .
5.2 Strongly Manipulable TBR
In this case we find that a subgame perfect equilibrium may not exist. The
problem is as follows. In stage 1, suppose that there are m (> 1) firms
charging the lowest (say) price p. In case c′−1(p) > d(p)m then, given that the
strategy space is not bounded, an equilibrium for the stage 2 game may not
exist. Since m can be small, we cannot use the techniques used in Section
3.2 to resolve this problem.
Example. Suppose n = 2, d(p) = a − p, γ(qi, qj) = qiq1+q2 and c(q) =
q2
2 . Suppose that both firms charge p, where a/2 > p > a/3. Let q
′(p, 1)
solve pd(p)γ1(q, q) = c′(q). Observe that 2q′(p, 1) =
√
p(a− p) < a − p, so
that both firms producing q′(p, 1) cannot be an equilibrium. Whereas since
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c′−1(p) = p > a−p2 , both firms producing c
′−1(p) cannot be an equilibrium
either. Finally, suppose to the contrary there is an asymmetric equilibrium,
where firm i produces qi. Clearly, q1+ q2 > d(p). Thus, from the first order
conditions, pd(p)γ1(q1, q2) = c′(q1) and pd(p)γ1(q2, q1) = c′(q2). But taken
together, these equations imply that q1 = q2.
6 Conclusion
To begin with we discuss the relationship of this paper to the literature. For
convenience the discussion is organized around a few remarks.
Remark 1. Our results are consistent with Shubik (1959, Chapter
5) who demonstrates that, under Bertrand-Edgeworth competition (both
one stage and two stage) with continuous prices and strictly convex cost
functions, any pure strategy equilibrium must involve the competitive price.
In general of course, no pure strategy equilibrium exists. Dixon (1987,
1993) solves the non-existence problem for one stage games by introducing
various rigidities, e.g. menu costs (formalized through the notion of epsilon-
equilibrium in Dixon (1987)), and integer pricing (Dixon (1993)). In a two
stage game, Dixon (1990) introduces rigidities that take the form of costs
involved in turning consumers away. These papers demonstrate that, in the
presence of the appropriate rigidities, there are “equilibrium” prices which
are arbitrarily close to the competitive price whenever the industry is large
enough, results that are close in spirit to the present one.
Remark 2. Next consider price competition with linear and capacity
constrained cost functions. In a model with the efficient rationing rule, Vives
(1986, proposition 2(iii)) shows that, for a given firm size, one obtains the
perfectly competitive price as the number of firms goes to infinity. For
the parallel rationing rule Bo¨rgers (1992) shows that iterated elimination of
dominated strategies yields prices close to the competitive price.
For the proportional rationing rule, however, Allen and Hellwig (1986)
demonstrate that in general, there is no pure strategy equilibrium. More-
over, in the limit, the mixed strategy equilibrium does not converge in the
support. Since the cost functions are linear and capacity constrained, firms
produce till capacity if at all (provided there is demand), but not beyond
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that. Thus, given the nature of the cost functions, the TBR is effectively
weakly manipulable. Since in this paper we do not consider the case where
a proportional rationing rule is coupled with a weakly manipulable TBR,
the results in Allen and Hellwig (1986) are not inconsistent with ours.
Remark 3. In the present paper the limiting procedure involves taking
the number of firms to infinity, while keeping the grid-size constant.20 Ar-
guably there are other papers in the literature that follow a similar limiting
procedure, e.g. Dixon (1987, 1990, 1993) and Roy Chowdhury (1999). All
these papers use limiting procedures that involve taking the number of firms
to infinity, while keeping constant the size of some relevant rigidity in the
model. In Dixon (1993) and Roy Chowdhury (1999) this rigidity takes the
form of grid-pricing. While prices are modeled continuously in Dixon (1987,
1990), both involve rigidities (described in Remark 1 above).
Remark 4. Next note that in Allen and Hellwig (1986), Dixon (1987,
1990, 1993) and Vives (1986), the limiting procedure not only involves taking
the number of firms to infinity, but also involves taking “firm size”, relative
to market demand, to zero. In Allen and Hellwig (1986) and Vives (1986)
this is done by taking the capacity level of the firms to zero, while in Dixon
(1987, 1990, 1993) this is done by replicating the market demand function.
Under our approach, however, relative firm size is kept unchanged.
The idea is as follows. Under our approach the number of firms is exoge-
nous (so that there is no exit) and there are no setup costs, so that one can as-
sume, without loss of generality, that c(0) = 0. Moreover, since the cost func-
tion is strictly convex, the efficient scale of production is zero.21 Hence, given
that the firms are already ‘very small’ compared to market demand, the lim-
iting procedure only involves taking the number of firms to infinity. Other
papers to employ a similar limiting procedure include, Tasna´di (1999a) and
Roy Chowdhury (1999) (Bertrand-Edgeworth), Novshek and Roy Chowd-
hury (2003) (Bertrand-Chamberlin) and Ruffin (1971) (Cournot).
Dixon (1993) shows that if one replicates both demand and firms, then
20Of course, in Section 3.3 we also examine the effect on equilibrium outcomes if the
grid-size is taken to zero.
21Alternatively, given that there is no exit, the appropriate measure of efficient scale in
this paper is argminq
c(q)−c(0)
q
= 0.
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in a one stage model with weakly manipulable TBRs, Nash equilibria are
non-unique. This demonstrates the importance of the replication procedure.
Remark 5. In this paper the equilibrium profit levels of the firms de-
pend on the TBR. Given that there is grid-pricing and there is a unique
single price equilibrium such that the residual demand binds strictly, this
dependence is to be expected. In the context of grid-pricing, such depen-
dence is not new in the literature though, e.g. Harrington (1989) and Maskin
and Tirole (1988, footnote 13). Of course, the TBR will not affect the profit
levels if the equilibrium is in atomless mixed strategies (e.g. Vives (1986),
and Allen and Hellwig (1993) for the symmetric case).22
Remark 6. Interestingly, for strongly manipulable TBRs the equilib-
rium involves excess production, which is inefficient. Given the nature of
the TBR, this result is, perhaps, only to be expected. While Allen and
Hellwig (1986, 1993), Osborne and Pitchik (1986), and Tasna´di (1999b), all
have srongly manipulable TBRs, these papers assume that the cost func-
tions are linear and capacity constrained. Hence these TBRs are, in effect,
not strongly manipulable, so that a similar effect does not appear in these
papers. Thus the present paper is one of the very few that deal with strongly
manipulable TBRs, in particular the limit properties of equilibrium when
the TBR is strongly manipulable.
In conclusion, in this paper we re-examine the non-existence problem
associated with pure strategy Nash equilibrium under price competition (i.e.
the Edgeworth paradox). We consider a model of Bertrand-Edgeworth price
competition with strictly convex costs and discrete pricing. If firms are
symmetric than, for a large class of residual demand functions there is a
unique equilibrium in pure strategies whenever, for a fixed grid size, the
number of firms is sufficiently large. Moreover, the equilibrium price is
within a grid unit of the competitive price. Our analysis also has interesting
implications for the folk theorem of perfect competition. To a large extent,
the results go through when the firms are asymmetric, or they are symmetric
but play a two stage game and the TBR is weakly manipulable.
22Deneckere and Kovenock (1996) show that, for the classical Bertrand-Edgeworth
model, equilibrium profits are invariant with respect to the TBR.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Notice that
lim
n→∞ p
∗d(p∗)γ1(
d(p∗)
n− 1 , d(p
∗)) = p∗d(p∗)
1
d(p∗)
(from A6(iv))
= p∗ > c′(0) = lim
n→∞ c
′(
d(p∗)
n− 1).
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose not, i.e. let q′(n− 1) ≤ d(p∗)n−1 . Observe that
p∗d(p∗)γ1(q′(n− 1), (n− 1)q′(n− 1))
≥ p∗d(p∗)γ1(d(p
∗)
n− 1 , d(p
∗)) (since γ1(x, nx) is decreasing in x)
> c′(
d(p∗)
n− 1) (since n ≥M1)
≥ c′(q′(n− 1)) (since q′(n− 1) ≤ d(p
∗)
n− 1).
This, however, violates Eq. (6).
Proof of Lemma 3. Let the number of firms charging pˆi be k, where
k ≥ nˆi. First consider the case where none of the other firms charge prices
that are less than pˆi. Clearly, if all the firms charging pˆi produce identical
amounts then the maximum profit of all such firms is pˆid(pˆi)k −c(d(pˆi)k ). Since
k ≥ nˆi, this is less than pˆi.
Now consider the case where the output level of the firms charging pˆi
are not the same. Clearly, if the aggregate production by all such firms
are less than equal to d(pˆi), then some of the firms would be producing
and selling less than d(pˆi)k , and consequently would have a profit less than
pˆid(pˆi)
k − c(d(pˆi)k ) < pˆi. Whereas, if the aggregate production of such firms
is greater than d(pˆi), then some firms would sell less than
d(pˆi)
k , while their
production would be larger. Again their profit would be less than pˆid(pˆi)k −
c(d(pˆi)k ).
Finally, if some of the other firms charge less than pˆi, then the residual
demand at pˆi would be even less than d(pˆi). We can now mimic the earlier
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argument to claim that some of the firms charging pˆi would have a profit
less than pˆid(pˆi)k − c(d(pˆi)k ).
Proof of Lemma 4. Suppose to the contrary that limn→∞ q′(n− 1) = D,
where D > 0. Then
lim
n→∞ p
∗d(p∗)γ1(q′(n− 1), (n− 1)q′(n− 1)) = 0 (from A6(vi))
< c′(D) = lim
n→∞ c
′(q′(n− 1)).
This, however, violates Eq. (6).
Proof of Proposition 4. (i) Follows since c′(0) < p∗(α) ≤ c′(0) + α.
(ii)(a) Define n∗∗(α) = d(p
∗(α))
c′−1(p∗(α)) . Since n
∗∗(α) ≤ n∗(α) ≤ N1(α), from
Proposition 4(i) it is sufficient to observe that limα→0 n∗∗(α)→∞.
(ii)(b)(A). To begin with, consider a candidate SPE where all firms
charge pc(n). Clearly, the optimal quantity decisions must involve all firms
supplying d(pc(n))n . We argue that such an outcome cannot be sustained as an
equilibrium. Consider P,Q such that all firms other than i charge pc(n) and
supply d(pc(n))n , and firm i charges pi ≥ pc(n) and supplies maxqi Ri(P,Q).
Let pii(pi,maxqi Ri(P,Q)) = pimaxqi Ri(P,Q) − c(maxqi Ri(P,Q)). Since,
pc(n) = c′(
d(pc(n))
n ), it follows that
∂pii(pi,maxqi Ri(P,Q))
∂pi
|pi→pc(n)+ = [pc(n) −
c′(d(pc(n))n )]
∂[maxqi Ri(P,Q)]
∂pi
|pi→pc(n)+ + d(pc(n))n = d(pc(n))n > 0. Thus, by in-
creasing its price from pc(n) by a sufficiently small amount, firm i can
increase its profits. Next consider a SPE where all firms charge p′. For
p′ < pc(n), the outcome must involve all firms producing c′−1(p′), whereas
for p′ > pc(n), the outcome must involve all firms producing
d(p′)
n . Clearly,
as p′ converges to pc(n), these output levels converge to
d(pc(n))
n . Hence,
from A8, there exist −→α > 0 and  > 0, such that ∀0 < α < −→α and
∀p ∈ [pc(n) − , pc(n) + ] such that p ∈ F (α), in any candidate SPE
where all firms charge p, firm i can deviate to p+ α and gain.
Note that dpin(p)dp |p→pc(n)+ =
∂pii(pi,maxqi Ri(P,Q))
∂pi
|pi→pc(n)+ = d(pc(n))n > 0.
Let p′(n) be a global maximizer of pin(p) over [pc(n), pmax], such that pin(p)
is strictly increasing for p ∈ [pc(n), p′(n)). Hence pc(n) < p′(n) < pmax.
Next, ∀p ≥ 0, let pi(p) = pmin{c′−1(p), d(p)} − c(min{c′−1(p), d(p)}) (given
A1 and A2, pi(p) and pin(p) are continuous in p). Note that (a) ∀p such
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that pmax ≥ p > pc(n), c′−1(p) > d(p)n , so that pi(p) > pin(p), and (b)
pi(pc(n)) = pin(pc(n)) (since c′−1(pc(n)) =
d(pc(n))
n ).
Next we consider a sequence < pn > such that p1 = p′(n) and ∀i ≥ 2,
pi is the minimum p such that pi(p) = pin(pi−1). From property (a) in the
earlier paragraph, < pn > is a decreasing sequence. (Consider some pi,
p′(n) ≥ pi > pc(n), i ≥ 1. Thus pi(pi) > pin(pi) > pin(pc(n)) = pi(pc(n)).
Hence, from the intermediate value theorem, there exists some p < pi, such
that pi(p) = pin(pi). Clearly, p′(n) ≥ pi+1 > pc(n).) Further, from property
(b), < pn > is bounded below by pc(n), so that it converges to pc(n).
(Suppose it converges to some p′′, p′(n) > p′′ > pc(n). Then pin(p′′) = pi(p′′),
which contradicts property (a).) Thus, whenever pc(n+ < p′(n) (where
 > 0 is as defined earlier in the first paragraph of this proof of Proposition
4(ii)(b)(A)), there exists N > 1 such that pN−1 ≥ pc(n) +  > pN .
Next, since pc(n) −  < pc(n), ∃ ︷︸︸︷α > 0 be such that ∀0 < α < ︷︸︸︷α ,
d(pc(n) −  + α) − (n − 1)c′−1(pc(n) − ) > c′−1(pc(n) −  + α). Consider
p < pc(n)− . Then d(p+α)− c′−1(p+α) > d(pc(n)− +α)− c′−1(pc(n)−
 + α) > (n − 1)c′−1(pc(n) − ) > (n − 1)c′−1(p). Hence, ∀α < ︷︸︸︷α and
p ≤ pc(n)− , d(p+ α)− (n− 1)c′−1(p) > c′−1(p+ α).
Define α′ = min{pN−pN−1, ︷︸︸︷α , −→α } and consider 0 < α < α′. Consider
some candidate single price equilibrium where the active firms charge p ∈
F (α). Since firms can always charge p∗(α) and sell d(p
∗(α))
n , all firms must
be active in this equilibrium.
First, we can rule out any candidate SPE p, such that p < pc(n)−. Since
α <
︷︸︸︷
α , we can show that a firm can deviate to p+α and make a gain. The
output levels of the other firms who charge p, are c′−1(p). Given A7(i), the
residual demand facing the deviating firm is at least d(p+α)−(n−1)c′−1(p).
Next note that since α <
︷︸︸︷
α ,
d(p+ α)− (n− 1)c′−1(p) > c′−1(p+ α).
Thus, if a firm charging p deviates to p+α, then it can supply till its marginal
cost. Since p+ α > p, its profit will increase.
Next, consider a candidate SPE p, such that p ∈ [pc(n) − , pc(n) + ].
Since α < −→α , a firm can charge p + α and gain. Next consider p such
that p′(n) ≥ p > pc(n) + . Since α < pN − pN−1, a firm can undercut by
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charging p − α and gain. (Of course, if pc(n) +  ≥ p′(n), then this step is
redundant.) Next, for pc(n) ≤ p < p′(n), let p(p) be the maximum price
such that pin(p) = pin(p(p)) and p(p) > p. For some candidate SPE where
all firms charge p, where p′(n) < p ≤ p(pc(n) + ), a firm can deviate to
p−1(p)−α, and gain. Finally, for any candidate SPE where all firms charge
p, where p > p(pc(n) + ), a firm can deviate to p′α, where p′α ∈ F (α) is the
price on the grid which is closest to p′(n), and gain.
(ii)(b)(B). Fix n. Let p˜(n) (p˜ from now on) satisfy c′−1(p˜) < d(p˜)2(n−1) .
Such a p˜ exists since (n− 1)c′−1(c′(0)) < d(c′(0))2 . Let p˜α denote the smallest
p ∈ F (α) such that p > p˜. Next, let α˜(p˜) be such that, ∀α < α˜(p˜), (n −
1)c′−1(p˜α) <
d(p˜α)
2 (such an α˜(p˜) exists since limα→0 p˜α = p˜).
Suppose to the contrary there is an equilibrium where the lowest price
charged p′ ≤ p˜. The profit of a firm charging p′ is at most p˜c′−1(p˜) −
c(c′−1(p˜)). Now suppose a firm charging this price deviates to p˜α ≤ p˜ + α.
The output levels of the other firms who charge p˜α or less, are at most
c′−1(p˜α). Given A7, the residual demand facing the deviating firm is at
least d(p˜α)− (n− 1)c′−1(p˜α). Next note that
d(p˜α)− (n− 1)c′−1(p˜α) > d(p˜α)2 > (n− 1)c
′−1(p˜α) ≥ c′−1(p˜α).
Thus, if a firm charging p′ deviates to p˜α, then it can supply till its marginal
cost. Since p˜α > p′, its profit will increase.
(iii)(a) The proof mimics that of Proposition 4(ii)(a).
(iii)(b) The proof is similar to that of Proposition 4(ii)(b) and is available
from the author.
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8 Some Additional Proofs
Proof that nˆ ≥ n∗. Suppose that N ≥ nˆ. Then, from the definition of nˆ,
it follows that r′i(pi, p, n)(p∗ − c′(d(p
∗)
N )) < 0. Since r
′
i(pi, p, n) < 0, p
∗ −
c′(d(p
∗)
N ) > 0, so that N ≥ n∗.
Proof of Proposition 3. From Lemma 4, limn→∞ q′(n − 1) = 0. Hence
limn→∞ nq′(n−1) = limn→∞(n−1)q′(n−1). Moreover, from Eq. (6), A6(ii)
and the fact that q′(n− 1) is decreasing in n, it follows that (n− 1)q′(n− 1)
is increasing in n.23
(i) Let c′(0) = 0, and suppose to the contrary that limn→∞(n− 1)q′(n−
1) = l, where l is finite. Then
lim
n→∞ p
∗d(p∗)γ1(q′(n− 1), (n− 1)q′(n− 1))
=
p∗d(p∗)
l
(from A6(iv))
> 0 = c′(0) = lim
n→∞ c
′(q′(n− 1)),
where the last equality follows from Lemma 4. But this contradicts Eq. (6).
(ii) Let c′(0) > 0 and suppose to the contrary that limn→∞(n−1)q′(n−1)
diverges to infinity. In that case
lim
n→∞ p
∗d(p∗)γ1(q′(n− 1), (n− 1)q′(n− 1)) = lim
n→∞ c
′(q′(n− 1)),
which, from A6(v) and Lemma 4, implies that c′(0) = 0. But this is a
contradiction. Hence let limn→∞(n− 1)q′(n− 1) = L, where L is finite. We
then mimic the earlier argument to show that L = d(p∗) p
∗
c′(0) .
23Suppose the number of firms increase from n to n+1, so that q′(n) < q′(n− 1). Now
suppose to the contrary that (n− 1)q′(n− 1) ≥ nq′(n). Then
p∗d(p∗)γ1(q
′(n), nq′(n)) > p∗d(p∗)γ1(q
′(n− 1), nq′(n− 1)) (since γ1(x, nx) is decreasing in x)
> p∗d(p∗)γ1(q
′(n− 1), (n− 1)q′(n− 1)) (since γ1(x, nx) is decreasing in n)
= c′(q′(n− 1)) (from Eq. (6)) > c′(q′(n)),
which contradicts Eq. (6).
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Properties of pc(n). (i) Note that c′(d(0)/n) > 0, c′(d(pmax)/n) = c′(0) <
pmax, and c′(q) is continuous and increasing in q. Hence pc(n) is well defined.
(ii) Suppose pc(n) ≥ pmax. Then pmax ≤ pc(n) = c′(d(pmax)/n) =
c′(0), which contradicts A2. Next suppose pc(n) = c′(0). Then, c′(0) =
c′(d(c′(0))/n), so that d(c′(0)) = 0, which is a contradiction.
(iii) Since d(p) is decreasing in p, and c(q) is convex, pc(n) is decreasing
in p.
(iv) Since pc(n) is decreasing in n, and bounded below by c′(0), limn→∞ pc(n) =
p is well defined. Thus p = limn→∞ c′(d(p)/n) = c′(0).
Proof of Proposition 4(iii)(b)(A). Consider a P,Q where all firms charge
pc(n). We then argue that, given P , the optimal quantity decisions must
involve all firms supplying d(pc(n))n .
Suppose not. Then the aggregate output must be greater than demand
at pc(n) (otherwise one of the firms will have an incentive to change its
output). Hence the quantity decisions must be symmetric (we can mimic
the argument in step 3 of Proposition 2 to show this), so that all firms
supply q′(pc(n), n − 1). Thus q′(pc(n), n − 1) > d(pc(n))n . Hence, from Eq.
(6), pc(n)d(pc(n))γ1(
d(pc(n))
n , (n− 1)d(pc(n))n ) > pc(n)d(pc(n))γ1(q′(pc(n), n−
1), (n−1)q′(pc(n), n−1)) = c′(q′(pc(n), n−1)) > c′(d(pc(n))n ). Note, however,
that this contradicts A9(ii).
Now suppose all firms other than i charge pc(n) and supply c′−1(pc(n)),
and firm i charges pi ≥ pc(n) and supplies maxqi Ri(P,Q). Next suppose
pii(pi,maxqi Ri(P,Q)) = pimaxqi Ri(P,Q) − c(maxqi Ri(P,Q)). Since, at
pc(n), price equals marginal cost,
∂pii(pi,maxqi Ri(P,Q))
∂pi
|pi→pc(n)+ = d(pc(n))n >
0.
Next, from A9(ii), pc(n)d(pc(n))γ1(
d(pc(n))
n , (n−1)d(pc(n))n ) < c′(d(pc(n))n ).
Hence, from continuity, for p′ close enough to pc(n), p′d(p′)γ1(
d(p′)
n , (n −
1)d(p
′)
n ) < c
′(d(p
′)
n ). Consider some SPE where all firms charge such a p
′
close to pc(n), p′ 6= pc(n), but the output vector do not involve every firm
producing min{c′−1(p′), d(p′)n }. Then the output vector must involve excess
supply, and hence, mimicing step 3 of Proposition 2, be symmetric. Thus all
firms supply q′(p′, n− 1) > d(p′)n . This is a contradiction since, from A6(iii)
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and A9(ii), p′d(p′)γ1(q′(p′, n−1), (n−1)q′(p′, n−1)) < c′(q′(p′, n−1)), which
violates Eq.(6). Hence, for all such p′ > pc(n), the only possible equilibrium
involves the firms supplying d(p′)/n. Whereas, for p′ < pc(n), the outcome
must involve all firms producing less than equal to d(p
′)
n . Since there is excess
demand, all firms must supply c′−1(p′). Then, from continuity (A8), ∃←−α > 0
and ′ > 0, such that ∀0 < α ≤ ←−α and ∀p ∈ [pc(n)− ′, pc(n)+ ′] such that
p ∈ F (α), in any candidate single price equilibrium where all firms charge p,
firm i can deviate to p+α and gain. Next define pN−pN−1 as in Proposition
4(ii)(b)(A). (We can adopt the same notation since we can assume, w.l.o.g.,
that  = ′, where  is as defined in Proposition 4(ii)(b)(A)).
Next consider a candidate SPE P,Q such that all firms charge p <
pc(n)− ′. We then argue that such a candidate SPE must involve all firms
supplying c′−1(p). (Suppose not. Then the aggregate output must be greater
than demand at p (otherwise one of the firms will have an incentive to change
its output). Hence the quantity decisions must be symmetric (we can mimic
the argument in step 3 of Proposition 2 to show this), so that all firms supply
q′(p, n− 1). Thus q′(p, n− 1) > d(p)n . Hence, from Eq. (6), pd(p)γ1(q′(p, n−
1), (n − 1)q′(p, n − 1)) = c′(q′(p, n − 1)). Since p < c′(d(p)n ), from A9(ii) it
follows that pd(p)γ1(
d(p)
n , (n − 1)d(p)n ) < c′(d(p)n ). Since q′(p, n − 1) > d(p)n ,
it must be that pd(p)γ1(q′(p, n − 1), (n − 1)q′(p, n − 1)) < c′(q′(p, n − 1)),
which is a contradiction.) Next, since pc(n)−′ < pc(n), ∃ α︸︷︷︸ > 0 such that
∀0 < α < α︸︷︷︸, d(pc(n)−′+α)−(n−1)c′−1(pc(n)−′) > c′−1(pc(n)−′+α).
Consider p < pc(n)− ′. Then d(p+ α)− c′−1(p+ α) > d(pc(n)− ′ + α)−
c′−1(pc(n) − ′ + α) > (n − 1)c′−1(pc(n) − ′) > (n − 1)c′−1(p). Hence,
∀α < α︸︷︷︸ and p ≤ pc(n)− ′, d(p+ α)− (n− 1)c′−1(p) > c′−1(p+ α).
Next define α′′ = min{pN − pN−1,←−α , α︸︷︷︸}, and let α < α′′.
To begin with since α < α︸︷︷︸, we can rule out SPE where firms charge
p < pc(n) − ′. This follows since in this case a firm can deviate to p + α
and gain. This follows since such a firm can sell c′−1(p + α), and charge
p + α > p. Whereas for any p ∈ [pc(n) − ′, pc(n) + ′], one of the firms
can increase its price to p + α and gain (since α < ←−α ). Finally, for any
candidate SPE where the firms charge p, such that p ∈ [pc(n) + ′, pmax],
we can mimic the argument in Proposition 4(ii)(b)(A) to show that a firm
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can undercut and gain. This follows since in any such equilibrium the profit
of the firms are bounded above by pin(p) and α < pN − pN−1.
4(iii)(b)(B). Fix n. As in Proposition 4(ii)(b)(B), let p˜(n) (p˜ from now
on) satisfy (n− 1)c′−1(p˜) < d(p˜)2 .
Next let q′(p, n−1) solve pd(p)γ1(q, (n−1)q) = c′(q). Let p(n) > c′(0) (p
from now on) be such that, ∀c′(0) ≤ p ≤ p, (n− 1)q′(p, 1) < d(p)− c′−1(p).
Such a p exists since, from A6(iii) and A9(ii), c′(0)d(c′(0))γ1(
d(c′(0))
n−1 , (n −
1)d(c
′(0))
n−1 ) < c
′(d(c
′(0))
n−1 ). Thus,
d(c′(0))
n−1 > q
′(c′(0), 1). (Such a q′(c′(0), 1) exists
since, from A6(iii), limq→0 c′(0)d(c′(0))γ1(q, (n− 1)q)→∞ > c′(0).) Hence
the claim.
Define pˆ(n) = min{p˜(n)/β, p(n)/β}, where β > 1 (p̂ from now on).
Let pˆα denote the smallest p ∈ F (α) such that p > pˆ. Next, let αˆ(pˆ)
be such that, ∀α < αˆ(pˆ), (n − 1)c′−1(pˆα) < d(pˆα)2 , and (n − 1)q′(pˆα, 1) <
d(pˆα)− c′−1(pˆα).
Suppose to the contrary there is an equilibrium where the lowest price
charged p′ ≤ pˆ. The profit of a firm charging p′ is at most pˆc′−1(pˆ) −
c(c′−1(pˆ)). Now suppose a firm charging this price deviates to pˆα ≤ pˆ + α,
where pˆα is smallest price on the grid that is greater that pˆ. The output levels
of the other firms who charge less than pˆα, are at most max{c′−1(pˆα), q′(pˆα, 1)}.
The argument is as follows. Consider some other firm j. If it produces
less than or equal to c′−1(pj), then there is nothing to prove. Hence suppose
it is producing more that c′−1(pj). Then there must be other firms charging
this price, and the total output of all such firms must exceed the residual
demand at pj . Since this residual demand is bounded above by d(pj), we
assume, without loss of generality, that the residual demand equals d(pj).
We can mimic the argument in step 3 of Proposition 2 to show that the
output level of all such firms are symmetric. Clearly, given A6(iii), q′(p, n−1)
is decreasing in n, and for p ≤ p, increasing in p. Hence the output of such
a firm is bounded above by q′(pˆα, 1).
Given A7, the residual demand facing this firm is at least d(pˆα) − (n −
1)max{c′−1(pˆα), q′(pˆα, 1)}. Since α < α̂(p̂), note that
d(pˆα)− (n− 1)max{c′−1(pˆα), q′(pˆα, 1)} > c′−1(pˆα).
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Thus, if a firm charging p′ deviates to pˆα, then it can supply till its marginal
cost. Since pˆα > p′, its profit will increase.
Proof of Proposition 5. Existence. Undercutting p∗ is clearly not prof-
itable. We then argue that for the i-th firm of type l, charging a higher
price, pi, is not profitable either.
As in Proposition 1, d(p
∗)
n = ril(p
∗, p∗, n). Notice that since n ≥ n∗l ,
d(p∗)
n < c
′−1
l (p
∗). Hence for any pi ≥ p∗,
c′−1l (pi) ≥ c′−1l (p∗) ≥ ril(pi, p∗, n). (14)
Since c′−1l (pi) > ril(pi, p
∗, n), the deviant firm supplies the whole of the
residual demand coming to it. Hence for a firm charging pi (≥ p∗)
pil(pi, ril(pi, p∗, n)) = piril(pi, p∗, n)− cl(ril(pi, p∗, n)). (15)
∂pil(pi, ril(pi, p∗, n))
∂pi
= r′il(pi, p
∗, n)[pi−c′l(ril(pi, p∗, n))]+ril(pi, p∗, n). (16)
Next from equation (5) it follows that ∀pi ≥ p∗, pi > c′l(ril(pi, p∗, n)).
Hence from the concavity of ril(pi, p∗, n) it follows that pil(pi, ril(pi, p∗, n))
is concave in pi. Moreover,
∂pil(pi, ril(pi, p∗, n))
∂pi
|pi→p∗+ = r′il(pi, p∗, n)|pi→p∗+[p∗ − c′l(
d(p∗)
n
)] +
d(p∗)
n
.
(17)
Since n ≥ nˆl, we have that ∂pil(pi,ril(pi,p
∗,n))
∂pi
|pi→p∗+ < 0. Next, from the
concavity of pil(pi, ril(pi, p∗, n)) it follows that ∀pi ≥ p∗, the profit of any
deviant firm is decreasing in pi.
Next, from Assumption 4(i), all firms have a residual demand of at least
d(p∗)
n . Thus, given
d(p∗)
n < c
′−1
l (q
∗), all firms produce at least d(p
∗)
n . Hence,
from A3(ii), A3(v) and A4(i), the residual demand of all firms is d(p
∗)
n .
Uniqueness. Step 1. We can first mimic the proof of Proposition 1 to
argue that there cannot be an equilibrium where the output level of some
of the firms is zero.
Step 2. We then demonstrate that there cannot be some p̂y (∈ F ) > p∗,
such that some of the firms charge p̂y and supply a positive amount.
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Suppose to the contrary that such a price exists. This implies that
the total number of firms charging p∗, say n˜, can be at most maxq n∗q − 1.
Otherwise, n˜ ≥ maxq n∗q and the residual demand facing all these firms
would be exactly d(p
∗)
n˜ .
24 Since d(p
∗)
n˜ < c
′−1
l (p
∗), ∀l, all such firms would
supply d(p
∗)
n˜ and the residual demand at any higher price would be zero.
Now consider some p̂y > p∗. Clearly, the number of firms charging p̂y
is less than maxq nqy. Otherwise, some of these firms, say of type l, would
have a profit less than p˜il. Hence such a firm would have an incentive to
deviate to p∗, when it can supply at least d(p
∗)
maxq n∗q
and earn p˜il. Thus the
total number of firms producing a strictly positive amount is less than N˜1,
thereby contradicting step 1.
Step 3. We can finally mimic step 3 of Proposition 1 to argue that all
firms have an output level of d(p
∗)
n .
Proof of Proposition 6. Step A. Existence. Notice that since α < c′2(0)−
c′1(0), it follows that ∀i ≥ 2, p∗1 < c′i(0). Thus no firm of type i, where i ≥ 2
can profitably charge a price of p∗1 and produce a strictly positive output
level. For type 1 firms we can simply mimic the proof in Proposition 1 to
claim that they cannot have a profitable deviation.
Step B. We first argue that in equilibrium all firms of type 1 charge p∗
and produce d(p
∗
1)
n1
, and all other firms have zero output.
First note that there cannot be an equilibrium where the output level of
some of the type 1 firms is zero.
We then argue that there cannot be some p̂x (∈ F ) > p∗1, such that some
of the type 1 firms charge p̂x and supply a positive amount. Suppose to the
contrary that such a price exists.
This implies that the total number of type 1 firms charging p∗1, say n˜, can
be at most n∗1 − 1. Otherwise the residual demand facing these firms would
be exactly d(p
∗
1)
n˜ .
25 Since n˜ ≥ n∗1, we have that d(p
∗
1)
n˜ < c
′−1
1 (p
∗
1). Hence all
24Given that d(p
∗)
n˜
< c′−1l (p
∗), ∀l, all firms must be supplying at least d(p∗)
n˜
. The
assertion now follows from an analogue of Assumption 4(i).
25First note that firms of type j > 1, even if they charge p∗1, would have an output of
zero. Thus the residual demand facing all firms of type 1 charging p∗1 is at least
d(p∗1)
n˜
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such firms would supply d(p
∗)
n˜ and the residual demand at any higher price,
px, would be zero.
Next consider some p̂x > p∗1. Clearly, the number of type 1 firms charging
p̂x is less than n1x. Otherwise, one of the type 1 firms would have a residual
demand that is less than or equal to d(p̂x)n1x . Since
d(p̂x)
n1x
< c′−1l (p̂x), this firm
would supply at most d(p̂x)n1x and have a profit less than p˜i1. Hence such a firm
would have an incentive to deviate to p∗1, when it can supply at least
d(p∗1)
n∗1
and earn p˜i1. Thus the total number of firms producing a strictly positive
amount is less than Nˆ2, a contradiction.
We can then mimic step 3 of Proposition 1 to argue that all type 1 firms
have an output level of d(p
∗)
n1
. Finally, since type 1 firms exhaust the demand
at p∗1, producing a positive amount is not profitable for other firms.
Proof of the example following Proposition 6. Let there be two
types of firms with c1(q) = q2 and c2(q) = q + q2, so that c′1(0) < c′2(0).
There are 2 firms of type 1 and n2 firms of type 2. The demand function is
q = 4− p, and the residual demand function is as follows:
Suppose there are m firms charging pi. Then Ri(P,Q) = qi, if ei-
ther
∑
pj=pi qj ≤ max[0, d(pi) −
∑
pk<pi
qk], or
∑
pj=pi qj > max[0, d(pi) −∑
pk<pi
qk] and qi ≤
max[0,d(pi)−
∑
pk<pi
qk]
m . Otherwise, Ri(P,Q) ≥
max[0,d(pi)−
∑
pk<pi
qk]
m .
Let α = 0.01, so that p∗1 = 0.01 and p∗2 = 1.01.
Step 1. We first argue that for n2 large enough, any possible equilibrium
must involve all firms of type 2 charging the price p∗2 and supplying the
whole of the residual demand coming to them.
1a. We first claim that there cannot be an equilibrium where the output
level of some of the type 2 firms is zero. This follows since these firms can
always charge p∗2 and obtain a residual demand of at least
d(p∗2)−2c′−12 (p∗2)
n2+2
> 0
(follows from the nature of the residual demand function).
(from A3(ii)), A3(iv) and A4(i)). Given that
d(p∗1)
n˜
< c′−11 (p
∗), all such firms of type 1
must be supplying at least
d(p∗1)
n˜
. The assertion now follows from an analogue of A3(ii).
40
Next let
pi′ = p∗2
d(p∗2)− 2c′−12 (p∗2)
n∗2 + 2
− c(d(p
∗
2)− 2c′−12 (p∗2)
n∗2 + 2
).
1b. We then argue that there cannot be some p̂i (∈ F ) > p∗2, such that
some of the type 2 firms charge p̂i and supply a positive amount. Suppose to
the contrary that such a price exists. This implies that the total number of
type 2 firms charging p∗2, say n˜, can be at most n∗2−1. Otherwise, the residual
demand facing these firms would be less than d(p
∗
2)
n˜ . Since
d(p∗2)
n˜ < c
′−1
2 (p
∗
2),
all such firms would supply the demand coming to them and the residual
demand at any higher price, p̂i, would be zero.
Now consider some p̂i > p∗. Clearly, if the number of firms charging p̂i
is large, then some of these firms would have a profit less than pi′. Hence
such a firm would have an incentive to deviate to p∗2, when it can earn at
least pi′. Thus, if the total number of type 2 firms is large, then all of them
must be charging p∗2.
Step 2. Next consider type 1 firms. For n2 large, neither of these firms
can be charging p∗2, since, in that case, the profit of the type 1 firm will be
small, and it can do better by charging c′2(0).
Step 3. Given step 2, the only possible equilibrium must involve both
the type 1 firms charging c′2(0) = 1 and supplying c
′−1
1 (1) = 0.5 when they
have a profit of 0.25 each.
3a. Given that all type 2 firms are charging p∗2, in equilibrium the type
1 firms cannot be charging a price strictly greater than p∗2, since in that case
the type 1 firms will have no demand.
3b. Whereas if they charge a price strictly lower than c′2(0), then their
profit will be lower compared to what they obtain from charging c′2(0). This
follows since the maximum possible output of the other type 1 firm is c′2(0),
so that for all p ≤ c′2(0), the residual demand facing this type 1 firm is less
than c′−1(0).
Step 4. We finally argue that both the type 1 firms charging c′2(0) cannot
be an equilibrium. Since both the type 1 firms supply c′−11 (1) = 0.5, the total
amount supplied by the type 2 firms will be 1.99 (= 4−p∗2−1). Next suppose
that a type 1 firms deviates to 1.02 (= p∗2+α). Given that the rationing rule
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is efficient, it can supply the residual demand 0.49 (= 4−p∗2−α−1.99−0.5)
and increase its profit level to 0.2597. Hence no equilibrium exists.
Proof that Eq. (11) has a unique solution. Consider the negative of
the Jacobian of Eq. (11), [J ], where the first row refers to the first firm
of type 1, the second row refers to the second firm of type 1, and so
on. Clearly, jkk = c′′l (qil) − p∗d(p∗)γ11(qil,
∑
a
∑
b qab − qil) and jkz|z 6=k =
−p∗d(p∗)γ12(qil,
∑
a
∑
b qab − qil), such that k refers to the appropriate firm
i of type l. Let [J11n−1] denote the n− 1× n− 1 matrix obtained from [J ] by
deleting the first row and the first column.
For the Gale-Nikaido (1965) univalence theorem to hold, it is sufficient
to show that [J ] is positive definite. (The other condition that ∀i, l, qil is
defined over a convex domain, is clearly satisfied.) Note that ∀k, jkz = jk,
whenever z 6= k. Moreover, ∀k, jkk > jk > 0 (this follows since ∀i, l,∑
a
∑
b qab− qil > qil > 0, so that γ12(qi,
∑
j 6=i qj) < 0, and γ11(qi,
∑
j 6=i qj)−
γ12(qi,
∑
j 6=i qj) < 0).
Define [J˜ ], such that, j˜11 = j1, and, ∀kl 6= 11, j˜kl = jkl. Let [J˜22n−1]
denote the n − 1 × n − 1 matrix obtained by deleting the second row and
second column of [J˜ ]. Moreover, ∀i, define ci = jii − ji > 0. Finally, let
[Z] denote the matrix where, ∀a 6= 1, 2, zab = jab and, ∀b, z1b = z2b = 1.
Clearly, |Z| = 0.
The proof is by induction on the size of the matrix.
Induction Hypothesis: All principal minor of order m of [J ] are positive.
Moreover, all principal minor of order m of [J˜ ] such that the first row is kept
unchanged, are positive.
Clearly the induction hypothesis holds for m = 2. Next suppose that
it holds for m ≤ n − 1. To show that it holds for m = n. Note that
|J˜n| = c2|J˜22n−1|+j1j2|Z| > 0, where the inequality follows from the induction
hypothesis and the fact that |Z| = 0. Next, |Jn| = c1|J11n−1|+ |J˜n| > 0, where
the inequality follows from the induction hypothesis and the previous step.
The argument for the principal minors of [J ], and principal minors of [J˜ ]
where the first row is kept unchanged, are similar.
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Proof of Lemma 1′. Notice that
lim
n→∞ p
∗d(p∗)γ1(
d(p∗)
n− 1 , d(p
∗)) = p∗d(p∗)
1
d(p∗)
(from Assumption 6(iv))
= p∗ > c′l(0) = limn→∞ c
′
l(
d(p∗)
n− 1).
Proof of Lemma 2′. Suppose not, i.e. there is some l such that
(nl − 1)q′l +
∑
j 6=l
njq′j ≤ d(p∗). (18)
Then
q′l ≤
d(p∗)
(nl − 1) ≤
d(p∗)
n− 1 . (19)
Next observe that
p∗d(p∗)γ1(q′l, (n
l − 1)q′l +
∑
j 6=l
njq′j)
≥ p∗d(p∗)γ1(q′l, d(p∗)) (from Eq. (18) and since in this case γ12 < 0)
≥ p∗d(p∗)γ1(d(p
∗)
n− 1 , d(p
∗)) (from Eq. (19) and the fact that γ11 < 0)
> c′l(
d(p∗)
n− 1) (since n ≥ M̂1)
≥ c′l(q′l) (from Eq. (19)). (20)
However, this violates Eq. (12).
Proof of Lemma 3′. Let the number of type l firms charging pˆi be k,
where k ≥ nˆil. First consider the case where none of the other firms charge
prices that are less than pˆi. Clearly, if all the type l firms charging pˆi
produce identical amounts then the maximum profit of all such firms is
pˆid(pˆi)
k − c(d(pˆi)k ). Since k ≥ nˆiil, this is less than pˆi.
Now consider the case where the output level of all the firms charging
pˆi are not the same. Clearly, if the aggregate production by all such firms
is less than equal to d(pˆi), then some of the firms would be producing and
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selling less than d(pˆi)k , and consequently would have a profit less than
pˆid(pˆi)
k −
cl(
d(pˆi)
k ) < pˆi. Whereas, if the aggregate production of such firms is greater
than d(pˆi), then some firms would sell less than
d(pˆi)
k , while their production
would be larger. Again their profit would be less than pˆid(pˆi)k − cl(d(pˆi)k ).
Finally, if some of the other firms charge less than pˆi, then the residual
demand at pˆi would be even less than d(pˆi). We can now mimic the earlier
argument to claim that some of the firms charging pi would have a profit
less than pˆid(pˆi)k − cl(d(pˆi)k ).
Proof of Proposition 7. Step 1. We first argue that all the firms must be
producing strictly positive amounts in equilibrium. Suppose to the contrary
that firm i of type l has an output level of zero.
(i) If the total production by the firms charging p∗ is less than d(p∗) then
firm i of type l can charge p∗. Since p∗ > c′(0), its profit would increase if
it produces a sufficiently small amount.
(ii) Next consider the case where the total production by the firms charg-
ing p∗ is greater than d(p∗). Without loss of generality let firms 1 to m
charge p∗, and, moreover, let firm 1 (of type k) have a strictly positive level
of output, i.e. q1k > 0. Note that
∂piil(qil,
∑
a
∑
b qab − qil)
∂qil
|qil=0 = p∗d(p∗)γ1(0,
m∑
j=1
qj)− c′l(0)
= p∗d(p∗)γ1(0,
m∑
j=1
qj)− c′k(0) (since c′l(0) = c′m(0))
> p∗d(p∗)γ1(q1k,
m∑
j=2
qj)− c′k(q1k) (since γ11 − γ12 < 0),
=
∂pi1k(q1k,
∑
a
∑
b qab − q1k)
∂q1k
= 0.
But then firm i of type l can charge p∗ and, by producing a sufficiently small
level of output, increase its profit level.
Step 2. We then argue that there cannot be some p̂i (∈ F ) > p∗ such
that some firms charge p̂i and supply a positive amount.
Suppose to the contrary that such a price exists. Then the total number
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of firms charging p∗ can be at most n∗∗ − 1. Suppose not. Clearly, the
aggregate production by these firms be less than d(p∗). Hence, all firms
of type l must be producing q∗l . But this implies that total production is
greater than d(p∗). (This follows from the definition of n∗∗). But this is a
contradiction. Thus the total number of firms is at most n∗∗− 1. Moreover,
the aggregate output of these firms can be at most q˜ (this follows from the
definition of q˜).
Now consider some p̂i > p∗. Clearly, the number of firms charging p̂i is
less than maxl nˆil. Since otherwise some of the firms charging p̂i would have
a profit less than pi. But such a firm can ensure a profit of at least pi by
charging p∗ (since the aggregate output of the firms charging p∗ is at most
q˜). Thus the total number of firms producing a strictly positive amount is
less than M̂2, thus contradicting step 1. Hence all firms charge p∗.
Step 3. We can mimic step 3 of the uniqueness part of Proposition 2
to claim that any equilibrium must be symmetric. Then, assuming that ∀l,
nl ≥ 2, we have that ∀i, l, ∑a∑b qab − qil > qil.
Note that given steps 1 and 3, we can restrict attention to qil such that,
∀i, l, ∑a∑b qab − qil > qil > 0, while solving Eq. (11).
Step 4. Next consider the game where all firms charge p∗ and compete
over quantities. Note that the profit function of the i-th firm of type l,
p∗d(p∗)γ(qil,
∑
k
∑
m qkm − qil) − cl(qil), is continuous in the output levels
and strictly concave in qil. Moreover, note that we can restrict attention to
strategy spaces of the form [0, qˆl], where qˆl is such that p∗d(p∗) − cl(q) <
0, ∀q > qˆl. Since these are non-empty, compact and convex subsets of
Euclidean spaces, we can use the Debreu (A social equilibrium existence
theorem, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 38, 1952, 886-
893.) fixed point theorem to argue that this game has a solution in pure
strategies. From step 1, this equilibrium must be interior. Moreover, given
that
∑
l n
l ≥ M̂1, the equilibrium must involve an aggregate output greater
than d(p∗), and hence will be characterized by Eq. (11). Therefore Eq. (11)
has a solution. Moreover, the solution is symmetric and characterized by
Eq. (12).
Step 5. We finally argue that the outcome described in Proposition 7
indeed constitutes an equilibrium.
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(i) Given Lemma 2′, no firm can increase its price and gain, as the
deviating firm will have no residual demand. Clearly, undercutting is not
profitable either.
(ii) We then argue that none of the firms can change its output level and
gain. Suppose firm i of type l produces qil, while the other firms stick to
the suggested output. We can argue as before that
piil(qil, (nl − 1)q′l +
∑
j 6=l
njq′j) = p
∗d(p∗)γ(qil, (nl − 1)q′l +
∑
j 6=l
njq′j)− cl(qil)
is concave in qil and
∂piil(qil,(n
l−1)q′l+
∑
j 6=l n
jq′j)
∂qil
|qil=0 > 0. Then
∂piil(qil, (nl − 1)q′l +
∑
j 6=l njq′j)
∂qil
|qil=q′l = p
∗d(p∗)γ1(q′l, (n
l−1)q′l+
∑
j 6=l
njq′j)−c′l(q′l).
(21)
Given Eq. (12), the firms have no incentive to change their output. Finally,
given that γ(qi,
∑
j 6=i qj) is symmetric, all the firms of the same type must
be selling an identical amount.
Proof of Lemma 4′. Suppose not, i.e. ∃l such that limr→∞ q′l(r) = D > 0.
Then we have that
lim
r→∞ γ1(q
′
l(r), (rn
l − 1)q′l(r) +
∑
j 6=l
rnjq′j(r))
≤ lim
r→∞ γ1(q
′
l(r), (rn
l − 1)q′l(r)) (since for rnl − 1 > 1, γ12 < 0)
= 0 (from Assumption 6(vi))
< c′l(D) = limr→∞ c
′
l(q
′
l(r)).
However, this is a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 8. Recall, from Lemma 4′, that limr→∞ q′l(r) = 0,
∀l. Hence limr→∞∑j rnjq′j(r) = limr→∞(rnl − 1)q′l(r) +∑j 6=l rnjq′j(r), ∀l.
(i) Suppose to the contrary that for some l, < (rnl−1)q′l(r)+
∑
j 6=l rnjq′j(r) >
does not diverge. Then there is a convergent subsequence < rk > such that
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limk→∞(rknl − 1)q′l(rk) +
∑
j 6=l rknjq′j(rk) = X, where X is finite. Then
lim
k→∞
p∗d(p∗)γ1(q′l(rk), (rkn
l − 1)q′l(rk) +
∑
j 6=l
rkn
jq′j(rk))
=
p∗d(p∗)
X
(from Assumption 6(iv))
> 0 = c′(0) = lim
k→∞
c′l(q
′
l(rk)),
where the last equality follows from Lemma 4′. But this is a contradiction.
(ii) We show that for all l, there cannot be any subsequence of < (rnl −
1)q′l(r)+
∑
j 6=l rnjq′j(r) > that either diverges, or converges to some limit dif-
ferent from d(p∗) p
∗
c′(0) . To begin with suppose that for some l, limr→∞(rn
l−
1)q′l(r) +
∑
j 6=l rnjq′j(r) diverges to ∞. From Eq. (12) it follows that
lim
r→∞ p
∗d(p∗)γ1(q′l(r), (rn
l − 1)q′l(r) +
∑
j 6=l
rnjq′j(r)) = limr→∞ c
′
l(q
′
l(r)).
Given Assumption 6(v) and Lemma 4′, the above equation implies that
c′(0) = 0, which is a contradiction. We can then mimic the earlier ar-
gument to claim that all convergent subsequences of < (rnl − 1)q′l(r) +∑
j 6=l rnjq′j(r) > converge to d(p∗)
p∗
c′(0) .
Proof of Proposition 9. The idea of the proof is very similar to that in
Proposition 2.
Step A. Existence. Notice that since α < c′2(0) − c′1(0), it follows that
p∗1 < c′i(0), for all i ≥ 2. Thus no firm of type j, where j ≥ 2 can profitably
charge a price of p∗1. For type 1 firms we can simply mimic the proof in
Proposition 2 to claim that they cannot have a profitable deviation.
Step B. We first argue that in equilibrium all firms of type 1 charge p∗,
produce q′1(n1 − 1) and sell d(p
∗
1)
n1
.
must be producing strictly positive amounts in equilibrium. The proof
is in several steps.
Step 1. We first argue that all the firms of type 1 must be producing
strictly positive amounts in equilibrium. Suppose to the contrary that firm
i (of type 1) has an output level of zero. Consider the aggregate output
produced by all the firms charging p∗1.
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(i) Suppose its less than d(p∗1). Let the i-th firm charge p∗1. Since p∗1 >
c′(0), for a sufficiently small output level, the profit of firm i would increase.
(ii) Next consider the case where the total production by the firms charg-
ing p∗1 is greater than d(p∗1). Without loss of generality let these firms be
1, · · · ,m, where m < i, and let q1 > 0. Note that
∂pii
∂qi
|qi=0 = p∗1d(p∗1)γ1(0,
m∑
j=1
qj)− c′(0)
> p∗1d(p
∗
1)γ1(q1,
m∑
j=2
qj)− c′(q1) (since γ11 − γ12 < 0),
=
∂pi1
∂q1
= 0.
But this implies that firm i can increase its output slightly and gain.
Step 2. We then argue that there cannot be some p̂i (∈ F ) > p∗1 such
that some firms of type 1 charge pi and supply a positive amount.
Suppose to the contrary that such a price exists. This implies that the
total number of type 1 firms charging p∗1, say n˜, can be at most n∗1 − 1.
Suppose not, i.e. let the number of such type 1 firms be n∗1 or more. In that
case, if the aggregate production by these n˜ firms is less than d(p∗1), then
all n˜ firms must be producing q∗1. But this implies that total production is
greater than d(p∗1). (This follows from the definition of n∗1). But this is a
contradiction.
Now consider some p̂i > p∗1. Clearly, the number of type 1 firms charging
p∗1 is less than nˆ1i . Thus the total number of type 1 firms producing a strictly
positive amount is less than M12 , thus contradicting step 1. Hence all firms
of type 1 must be charging p∗1.
Step 3. Let q˜, denote the equilibrium output vector of type 1 firms. We
first establish that this vector must be symmetric. Suppose not, and without
loss of generality let q˜2 > q˜1 > 0, where both the firms are of type 1. Then,
∂pi1
∂q1
|q˜ = p∗1d(p∗1)γ1(q˜1,
∑
i6=1
q˜i)− c′(q˜1)
> p∗1d(p
∗
1)γ1(q˜2,
∑
i6=2
q˜i)− c′(q˜2) (since γ11 − γ12 < 0)
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=
∂pi2
∂q2
|q˜. (22)
This, however, is a contradiction, since in equilibrium ∂pi1∂q1 |q˜ = 0 = ∂pi2∂q2 |q˜.
Step 4. Finally, we argue that there cannot be another symmetric equi-
librium where the (common) output level of the firms is different from
q′1(n1 − 1). Clearly, in any symmetric equilibrium, the production level
of all the firms must satisfy
p∗1d(p
∗
1)γ1(q, (n
1 − 1)q) = c′1(q).
It is easy to see that this equation has a unique solution. The argument is
similar to that for the uniqueness of q′(n− 1).
Finally, since type 1 firms exhaust the demand at p∗1, the output level of
all firms of other types must be zero.
Proof of Proposition 10. Existence. We first argue that the quantity
decisions are optimal. Let p′ denote the lowest price in {P}. Given A3(v),
Rp
′
(P,Qp′(P )) is well defined. Next, given the quantity decisions of the
other firms, the output decisions of the firms charging p′ are clearly optimal.
Next from A3(iv), Rpi(P,Qpi) is well defined. Moreover, given the quantity
decisions of the other firms, the output decisions of the firms charging pi are
clearly optimal.
Next note that the stage 2 strategy implies that if, in stage 1, all the
firms charge p∗, then, in stage 2, all the firms produce d(p
∗)
n . Similarly, if
in stage 1, (n − 1) of the firms charge p∗, while one of the firms charges a
price strictly greater than p∗, then, in stage 2, the firms charging p∗ produce
d(p∗)
n−1 , while the output level of the other firm is zero.
The pricing decision is also optimal since if any of the firms increase its
price then, in stage 2, the output level of the other firms are such that the
deviant firm has zero residual demand.
Uniqueness. It is easy to see that we cannot have an equilibrium where
the output level of some of the firms is zero, since it can always charge p∗
in stage 1 and supply d(p
∗)
n in stage 2.
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Next observe that the definitions of p˜i, ni and n∗ are valid for this case
also. Hence we can mimic step 2 of the uniqueness part of Proposition 1 to
argue that the only price that is sustainable in equilibrium is p∗. Finally,
we can mimic step 3 of Proposition 2 to argue that all firms supply exactly
d(p∗)
n .
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